


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SOME REMARKS
ON THE
APPARENT CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THE
W A R
IN THE FOURTH WEEK
OF
OCTOBER 1795.

by L. Auckland.

“ Que faire encore une fois dans une telle nuit ? ” —

“ Attendre le jour. ”

L O N D O N :

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OCTOBER 24th, 1795.

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IT is the purpose of the following pages to give a general view of the circumstances and interests of the French Revolution, and the French war, as they appear to me in the month of October 1795.

The attempt presents many discouragements at the outset; the objects are extensive, numerous, and complicated; they are, as yet, too near to us to be justly estimated, and in a course of varying movement, which baffles every attempt to place them in any precise and settled point of view.

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The mind of every man has been fatigued by long agitations amidst these bewildered and unnatural scenes, and is brought with reluctance, pain, and loathing, to a new consideration of them.

I shall, nevertheless, try to state my ideas with candour and with plainness, in the order in which they offer themselves. The same ideas have been separately discussed by many: the task, which I prescribe to myself, is to bring them together, and to lead them to certain conclusions.

If in the result, I can contribute either to a just appreciation of the great interests in question, or in any degree assist others more able to form such an appreciation, I shall think that my time and attention have been employed to good effect, both politically and morally.

§ 2. The people of France have been in a state of insurrection from the month of July, 1789, and in a state of war with foreign powers from the time of their de-

crees* of war against the Emperor, and their invasion of the Austrian Netherlands, in April, 1792. This combined pressure of interior and exterior troubles has been aggravated by a suspension of commerce, a failure of manufactures, an interruption of agriculture, a great emigration, disbursements from the public treasure beyond any example among nations, large exportations of specie, and a dearth of the necessaries of life. To these evils we may add the excesses of individuals and of factions struggling for the ascendancy, and a train of miseries resulting from anarchy, commotions, civil war, pillage, and massacres, with and without the colour of law.

* Premier Decret. “ *Le roi de Hongrie & de Bohême a attenté à la souveraineté nationale, en déclarant
“ vouloir soutenir la cause des princes possesseurs en Alsace,
“ qui ont constamment refusé les indemnités qui leur ont été
“ offertes,” &c.*

Second Decret. “ *L'Assemblée Nationale fidèle au
“ serment qu'elle a fait de n'entreprendre aucune guerre,
“ dans l'esprit de conquête, ne prend les armes que pour le
“ maintien de sa liberté,” &c.*

The military and naval exertions, far from being broken by such a paroxysm, have been aided and maintained by it. The French armies, employed in the latter part of 1793 and in 1794, are said to have amounted to 800,000 men: in some reports of the Convention they were stated at 1,000,000; at this hour they cannot be estimated at less than 600,000.

It would be here unmanly not to speak of their military success in the terms which are due to it. Much of that success may in truth be attributed to the overbearing force of numbers; but much was the result also of their own talents, activity, and perseverance. They have shewn to the world, that an undisciplined multitude, brought into the field partly through an enthusiasm of the popular mind, but more by the influence and urgency of famine, force, and terror, may learn, under self-taught generals, to defeat the best disciplined armies, headed by their sovereigns in person, and conducted
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by officers of the first abilities and experience. I enter not into other causes of their success; they would lead me into details to which history will render justice. The consequences are, that Europe has been overrun. The torrent of conquest and desolation is still rushing forwards; and those who direct the war profess not to suspend their efforts, till they shall have dictated a pacification, which (according to their decree passed a few days ago) is to unite to their empire, either in possession or in dependence, a great extension of territory, new barriers, many frontier places of strength, a large sea-coast, and several sea-ports.

§ 3. As far as military prowess can avail, France certainly has acquired good ground of self-confidence; and in this respect, her pretensions, gigantic as they are, do not at first sight appear extravagant.

But a nearer approach to those pretensions will place them in a different point of view;
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and it may even be doubted, whether the preponderance which France held through centuries in the scale of European powers will not eventually be destroyed by the effect of her present successes; or, at least, whether, so far as the political interests of Great Britain are concerned, she will remain an object of as much jealousy and alarm as she was under the late monarchy.

In saying this I am not seeking to conceal our embarrassments, or to palliate our disappointments; nor am I insensible to the unmerited fate and desolation of individuals and countries connected with us in the war: I am not disposed to under-rate a calamity subversive, for the present at least, of the balance of Europe, and which has threatened to demolish a system of civilization, under which my country enjoys a prosperity unparalleled in the history of man. But after avowing the evil, I may be permitted, in the hour of retirement and reflection, to examine the chances and means of emerging from it. If
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my speculations tend to inspire hopes beyond what the better opinion of others or future events may justify, it will not be from a desire to mislead, but from an error of judgment, arising from a disposition not to be disheartened by difficulties.

§ 4. Quitting therefore the vexatious spectacle of the conquests of France upon the continent, I now turn with some complacency to naval operations. In this branch of the war we relied almost entirely on ourselves; whilst the struggle on the continent was maintained on the one hand by numerous and united armies of the same country, and on the other by allies, whose supposed strength became their weakness, because it led them to miscalculate their means, and to make false combinations of measures and plans. In the conduct of the allied armies there was occasionally a want both of concert and confidence; their attention was sometimes distracted by projects of advantage, foreign or adverse to the gene-

ral cause; and in the most pressing moments of the war, some of them shewed more sollicitude to embarrass each other, than to crush the common enemy.

It is notorious that the naval exertions of France were made on the same principles, which formed her armies. She sent to sea a force great beyond expectation. She sacrificed her own commerce to find the means of interrupting ours. She has since added to her advantages the neutrality of Spain, and the ports of Flanders and Holland, and the disposal of the Dutch navy. And yet I do not speak vauntingly when I assert, that, though she has occasionally found means to annoy our commerce, the extent and prosperity of which oblige us to have vessels passing and repassing in every part of the ocean, she has ceased to alarm us as a competitor for naval dominion. Her naval failure is decided. Time and history will best shew, what proportion of that failure is to be attributed to the want of subordination; to the events at Toulon in 1793;

to the most important and essential victory gained by the British fleet on the 1st of June, 1794; to other glorious actions in the different seas; to the unremitted exertions of our boards of admiralty; to the conduct of our officers; and the valour of our seamen. The losses on our part by capture amount to two ships of the line, one of which has been retaken, and two frigates and a few inferior vessels; and by different accidents four British ships of the line have been burnt or sunk. On the part of the enemy, the losses by capture and burning, and by the accidents of sea, amount to thirty-three ships of the line, and near an hundred frigates and inferior vessels of war. It appears that we have commissioned six ships of the line, which belonged to the enemy, and that three more are in readiness, and to be immediately commissioned. Every ship thus brought into service operates in a doubled proportion upon the comparative force of the two navies; and, accordingly, the total relative difference in favour of England, by captures, burning, and sinking, since the commencement of the war, may be esti-

mated to be about thirty-six ships of the line, to which may be added, on similar principles of calculation, a farther difference of near eighty frigates. France now hardly possesses a fleet that she can venture to send to sea; her scanty supply of necessities from other countries depends on the casual arrivals of neutral vessels; she has abandoned her fisheries, the old and important object of our competition; her principal ports have been blockaded during several months; and our naval superiority is augmenting from day to day. I quit with reluctance this part of my subject, on which an English mind reposes with pleasure.

§ 5. In the predominancy of our navy we still possess the efficient and permanent cause of our prosperity. It is this consideration, which, notwithstanding the nullity of the present campaign in some parts of the continent, and its disastrous issue and circumstances in other parts, places us on higher ground for treating, than those on which we stood in any period of the last two

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years. It is our naval strength, which alone can give to us the means of restoring tranquillity to Europe. But in saying this, I do not mean to convey any dissent from the occasional expediency of continental operations in war: I even doubt, whether the danger of invasion could have been averted, and whether the naval superiority, on which I am now relying, could have been established, if the attention of the enemy had not been powerfully diverted, during the first two years of the war, by our treaties and continental alliances, and by the brave, though unsuccessful, exertions of our armies on the continent,

§ 6. There is another point, in which our comparative situation is much improved, and by which the successes of France may suddenly lose all their importance and effect. I never persuaded myself that France would soon arrive at the end of her resources, or that the expences, which Great Britain was incurring, would be of no serious consequence

to her. I have thought, however, that this war, like several modern wars, would become at last a struggle and question of finance. Here also I can look with complacency to the situation of our enemies: With them the supplies of the year are not equal to the expence of a month ; and the expence of a year is more than the whole amount of our national debt. Their *specie*, which in 1785 was estimated at eighty millions sterling, is nearly gone from the country, or is concealed. Their taxes are levied, and the exchanges of their interior trade are managed by a scanty supply of *specie*, by the transfer and barter of the necessaries of life ; a mode of existence ruinous to agriculture, and leading to every description of extortion and distress. The amount of the assignats, which have taken the place of the *specie*, is now said to be eighteen milliards, or seven hundred and twenty millions sterling ; the consequent depreciation is in the proportion of seventy five to one ; and there remain no visible resources, but in extremes of violence no longer applicable to
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the spirit and temper of the people. It is utterly inexplicable how a government so circumstanced, and with fourteen armies to be paid, cloathed, fed, and supplied, can find means to exist twenty-four hours.

From the first introduction of the system of assignats (founded in desperation and iniquity) it was easy to foresee the irretrievable ruin of the French finances, and the bankruptcy of their public debt, which was then solemnly placed under the guaranty of French honour and French good-faith; and it was a natural inference, that a failure of the assignats would produce a dissolution of the armies. They are now maintained by putting the physical resources and produce of the country into requisition: it is utterly impossible that this mode can be durable; and we have not heard that there is any other, to which it is possible to recur.

§ 7. It is not within my present plan to pursue the comparison to a statement of our
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own pecuniary means. I admit that, on our part, the drain upon the country for the expences of the war has been great; and, though the charge of continental armies, and of new levies on the continent is now much lessened, and will, I trust, undergo a total reduction, I do not suppose, if we continue to avoid the accumulation of unfunded debt, that the loan and taxes for the ensuing year will be much less than they were in the year 1795. But deploring, as I do, a course of events, which, before the next two months shall have elapsed, will have rendered indispensable so large an addition to the permanent taxes, I nevertheless see good ground of consolation in the resources which have thus far enabled us to bear the pressure. And here it is well worthy of remark, that the wise and vigorous system for the reduction of the debt established in 1786, has had, during the war, an uninterrupted and increasing effect; and even that additions have been made for lessening the debt, and for accelerating

rating the operation of compound interest. It is farther to be recollected, that the taxes imposed to pay the interest of the sums borrowed during the war include a provision of one per cent. for the gradual liquidation of the capital. It may be attributed chiefly to these salutary measures, that the price of the three per cents, which was £.55 in January, 1784, a period of peace, is £.68, at this day (Oct. 24th) notwithstanding the war, and the great additions made and making, to the capital of the debt.

§ 8. In looking forwards to the end of this conflict, it is some consolation to observe, that all the evils, which we have hitherto suffered by the war, are trivial in comparison of those with which we were menaced by the French, in the visitation of their revolutionary doctrines. The leaders of the French insurrection had, long before the war, conceived the project of rendering the danger general, in order to extricate them-

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selves amidst the general confusion. In their language, "it was expedient to set fire to every corner of Europe, and to destroy all established governments, by an eruption of the volcanic principle of equality." To this policy we may attribute their declarations, that all other countries were unhappy, ignorant, superstitious, and enslaved; that "a great battle was to be fought between errors and principles;" and that it was "the morning of reason dawning upon the earth." Their declamatory doctrines made some progress; and they proceeded to issue to all nations their solemn grant of universal fraternity, which was promulgated in all languages with great activity and expence.

§ 9. At the epoch of the declaration of war against these kingdoms and Holland, the people of the several governments of Europe, without exception, were in a dangerous state of ferment. This had not
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arisen entirely from the attraction of the new principles. The first successes of the French insurrection, a natural leaning to what was then thought to be the cause of liberty, the revolutions in the Belgic provinces and in Poland, and the total failure of the Austrian and Prussian campaign of 1792, followed by the successful invasion of Brabant, had, all together, excited the admiration of surrounding nations.

Every arrangement had been taken in the French ports and armies to commence hostilities at sea and on the continent, before it could be known in London or at the Hague that war was declared. The crisis was awful; and my imagination cannot fix bounds to the evils then impending, if the invasion of Holland * had met with the same success

* Dumouriez, in his Memoirs, and in his Letters to Pache and Miranda, affects to say, and others have repeated, that his success against Holland was prevented by the Austrian victories of the 1st and 3d of March. Those victories were glorious and important, and cer-

success which, through the hostility of the elements, and through other causes, it obtained two years afterwards. The great successes of the Austrian, English, and Dutch forces, during the first six months of the war, and the wise and spirited measures adopted and pursued for the security and defence of the interior of these kingdoms, gave a salutary check to the contagion of anarchy.

§ 10. After the capture of Valenciennes the tide of war turned against us. But men's minds had already revolted against the crimes and sanguinary character of the French revolution. Every individual, who possessed any integrity, any benevolence, or any sense of religion, shuddered when the

tainly confirmed the security of Holland at that time; but the fact is, that before Dumouriez was ready to attempt the passage of the Moerdyck, the English guards were arrived, and the gun-boats were stationed; and from that hour (every possibility of frost being over) his expedition was at all events baffled.

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excesses of a populous and enlightened nation became such as would be hardly credible, if said to be committed by armed savages in a state of intoxication and madness.

I turn from the recollection of those excesses to dwell for a few moments on the impression which they have left. The triumphs of a criminal people had not so far dazzled the world, as to subdue that abhorrence of crimes, which a benevolent Creator hath implanted in the human mind. The eyes of men were now opened ; and the notion of liberty, raised in the cradle of terror, amidst crowded camps and overflowing gaols, was considered as a phantom, a deception, a monstrous dream in a delirium.

§ 11. France will long serve as a beacon to other nations. The cruelties, which followed the seizure of ecclesiastical property, the avowal of infidelity and atheism, which
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seemed to serve as a pretext for robbing the churches, the profligacy of manners, encouraged by the new code of divorces, the requisitions against the farmers and shopkeepers, the law of the maximum, the forced loans, the compulsory enrolments, the domiciliary visits, the judicial massacres from prepared lists, were all admonitions to other countries to look with revived attachment to their own governments, in the worst of which some protection was given to life, property, and the exercise of religion. To Englishmen the comparison presented new grounds of fair national pride; it led them to contemplate and to cherish the whole system of their own civil and ecclesiastical establishment.

To all mankind one awful lesson will remain in the history of the leaders of the French insurrections, which, in the language of one of its principal leaders, is, “a recital of crimes punished:” One set of miscreants rapidly succeeded another by a sort of hereditary

hereditary succession, and every new administration murdered its predecessors. Thus it was that men, inveterate enemies of each other, were frequently brought together to the same scaffold, and at the same moment with the innocent victims of their cruelty. Many have escaped public execution by the resource of suicide; and others (whose moral punishment is perhaps the most severe) still survive.

§ 12. To those who meditate on the workings of the human mind, a doubt may perhaps arise, whether the effects, which I have described, though at present a salutary check to the dangerous spirit of innovation, may not hereafter prove favourable to abuses of power, by creating a timidity in the just cause of liberty.

I will hope, however, that if the season of peace should return, the misfortunes, which have been suffered by many, and the peril incurred by all, may produce a general softening of character, and a revision in

men's minds of their social situations and duties.—Governments will have learnt not to precipitate themselves into embarrassments by speculative wars; Sovereigns and Princes will not forget, that steadiness, moderation, and public œconomy, are the best supports of the eminence on which they stand; Nobles and men of property will reflect, that their large allotment of worldly advantages is for the aid and benefit of the whole; and the labouring classes (for such there must be whilst men are men) will feel, that sober industry, protected by established government, is seldom without the benefits of competence and security.

§ 13. These truths seem to be finding their way into the bosoms of the French nation also; “their fraternity” (as was lately stated to them in a solemn report) “has been the brotherhood of Cain and Abel;” and “they have organized nothing but bankruptcy and famine.”

Amidst the dispersion and destruction of
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their seminaries, libraries, and men of science, the humanizing effects of education have been suspended near six years ; and a large class of the people, in the most interesting time of life, has been reared in the dissoluteness of camps, and in the habits of violence and rapine. Still, however, that they are wearied with their agitations, we may infer from the ready acceptance of their new constitution. So far as can be foreseen, that constitution is the experiment of men disposed to try any thing to obtain repose ; and yet it affords small hope of a permanent resting place to the country. I admit that it contains many of the elements, which, when properly arranged, are known to form the best practical governments ; but the parts are strangely and anomalously combined : with one power to originate the laws ; with another to accept or reject, but not to propose laws ; and with a third power, which (though it seems in some respects to hold the kingly office in com-

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mission) is neither to propose, nor to accept, nor to reject laws, but to be responsible for a fourth power, which is to be employed to execute. To this jealous sovereignty, of which the annual expence and mere civil list will be at least a million sterling, * are to be added the paraphernalia of royalty without the dignity, and also the distinctions of aristocracy, both in the parade of dress and in privileges, beyond any that existed under the proscribed monarchy : We may reasonably infer, that the taste for democracy is much changed ; and yet, to crown the whole, the occasional interference of the populace, under the name of primary assemblies, is added to this incoherent system.

§ 14. It was reserved for the eighteenth century to see a great and enlightened nation, in which All, who were not shedding

* This would be the amount in specie ; if paid in assignats, it would be seventy-five million sterling.

tears, were rejoicing in the sufferings of others. "But what" (exclaimed Barrère, in adverting to one of the massacres) "what is the present generation in comparison of the generations which are to come?" It would be a waste of words to argue with men, who, by such phrases

"Stop up th' access and passage to remorse,

"That no compunctious visitings of nature

"Shake their fell purpose."

Still, however, to this application of the detestable doctrine of expedient crimes it may be answered, that in the eye of eternity the present generation is small indeed; but to the faculties and duties of man it is every thing: if, by the best exercise of his powers, he can contribute to the improvement and happiness of the generation in which he lives, he may rest assured that he has no better means of promoting the improvement and happiness of the generations which are to come.

§ 15. Every discussion respecting this eventful period derives, from the multiplicity and magnitude of its objects, a tone of declamation, which it is desirable to avoid. An interruption has certainly been given to the progress of arts, of science, and of letters; in return, scenes have been exhibited, which will for ages employ the painter, the moralist, the poet, and the historian.

§ 16. The French insurrection, considered distinct and separate from its crimes, exhibits a mixture of impiety, levities, and pedantry. A pantheon for the remains of Voltaire, Rousseau, Mirabeau, and Marat! All religion superseded by the goddess Reason, and this new divinity exhibited to the assembly of the nation in the person of a prostitute upon a pedestal! The chaunting of civic hymns by the legislators in chorus with fishwomen! The fraternity decreed to the public executioner! The affected use
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of the word citizen *, and the adoption of the classical forms of address ! The red caps, the civic feasts, the objects assigned to the festivals, and to the five complementary days of the calendar ! All these “fantastic tricks” before high Heaven” escape our indignation amidst the ridicule which they excite. We might forgive a nation for suffering itself to be persuaded that liberty consists in singularities ; but the singularities are so blended with atrocities, that it becomes painful on reflection to have smiled at them. These extravagancies, however, have had their use ;

* In recapitulating the pedantries, I ought not to forget the new phraseology (*le Néologisme de la Révolution.*) A catalogue of the new coined words would be curious : they were often characteristic of the speakers and actors, and of the progress through confusion to crimes. For example—“Nationaliser, fayettiser, fédéraliser, démocratiser, démoraliser, municipaliser, lanterner, volcaniser, septembriser, guillotiner, décatholiser, fraterniser, désocialiser, desorganiser, férociser, sansculottiser, panthéoniser : — et les substantifs ; Centralite, Civisme, Sansculottisme, Terrorisme, Républicanisme, Lezenation, Burocratie, Démonétisation, Baignade, Noyade, Fufillade, Rolandiste, Démocrate, Désorganisateur, Robespierriste, Ultra-révolutionnaire, Terroriste, Septembriseur, Sansculottiste, &c. &c. &c.”

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they have helped to eradicate from the minds of surrounding nations the admiration, which they were disposed to feel for the French insurrection.

§ 17. Still, however, we must recur to the impression made by the continental successes, to the avowed pretensions of aggrandizement, and to the apparent power of the French armies to enforce those pretensions; a due regard must be given to those objects, in considering what is next to be done, even if we should persuade ourselves that the doctrines and details of the French revolution are beginning to be seen by mankind, both with abhorrence and with contempt.

It cannot be denied, that the climate of a country, its extent, its populousness, and the nature of its government and usages, may gradually form a peculiarity of morals and manners in peace, and of resource and energy in war; but in reviewing the military achievements of the French, I cannot trace any effect, which did not naturally result from

from the mismanagement of others, co-operating with motives which no longer subsist, and supported by means which are ceasing to be practicable. At the same time it would be unjust to attribute to the national character of France a distinctive alacrity in crimes. It would be but a painful discussion, whether any other country possessing numerous inhabitants, vitiated by the corruptions of great and opulent cities, raised into fermentation by artful and desperate men, and thrown abruptly from the restraints of absolute monarchy to all the licentiousness of anarchy, might not have fallen into similar excesses and similar calamities. - I willingly believe that France is not in her natural state, but in a temporary delirium. I have insisted on this point, because the possibility, that a short time may produce great changes will merit attention, especially if it should be thought that I lay too much stress on the necessity of maintaining the war till we obtain the pacification which I shall describe.

§ 18. What turn the French insurrection may next be expected to take, what permanent form of government will at last be established, what relation it will hold with other nations, and to what extent the mischief may be carried, both on the continent and elsewhere, before general tranquillity and independence can be restored, are questions to which the mind looks with anxiety ; but they are far beyond the reach of human foresight.

It frequently happens, that the result of political measures may be predicted by those who are not engaged in them. When France took part in our American war, as the ally of a people in a state of insurrection, it was evident, notwithstanding Mr. Necker's assertions to the contrary, that she was incurring not only a great debt, but an increased deficiency of revenue, from which he afterwards struggled so helplessly to recover her. When the army and navy of the monarchy were employed to fight the battles of a revolt founded in republican principles ;

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when the ministers were permitted to indulge their vanity in tampering with innovations; when the spirit of reform among the people was excited by writers not discountenanced by the court; when the princes and nobles, under the idea of resembling Englishmen, wore the dresses of grooms, and confounded all appearances (which are always important to the reality) of rank and of inequality of condition; and when, at the same time, by their profligacy, futile manners, and irreligion, they were forfeiting all claim to respect, it was a severe lot which was falling upon the good and moral part of the nation; but it was impossible not to “distinguish the signs of the “times.”

In like manner, through the whole of the disputes with the parliaments, the reference to the two assemblies of notables, the invitation issued from Versailles to every individual in France to become a political adviser, and the entire formation and history of the constituent assembly, there was a

regular and evident progression (announced and lamented by many) towards the confusions which took place, and which, in despite of the new constitution, still prevail; but the situation to which that country is now brought sets at defiance all speculation; the vessel, now rolling without mast or rudder upon the ocean of events, is too large for the strength, and skill, and guidance of men. Whether some fortunate tide may bring her unbroken into port, or whether some new storm may throw her piece-meal upon the shore, time can alone ascertain.

§ 19. Certain it is, that there will be farther and great changes, and, probably, with the same quickness of transition with which the same individuals, who still maintain the ascendancy, formed the several contradictory constitutions of 1791, 1793, and 1795. France, having passed from an absolute monarchy, through the indefinable constitution of 1791, to a military democracy,

democracy, has now adopted a form of mixed oligarchy, which at best can only be stated and considered as an attempt or step towards a better system; and having gone round the circle, may at last settle either in a limited monarchy, or in the despotism from which she started. But it is hardly possible that some settlement can much longer be deferred. It was said a few weeks ago by one of the leaders, that the people are almost as much in want of a government as of bread.

§ 20. It is not easy to ascertain, whether the general spirit of the latter acts of the Convention is to be attributed to popular influence; but certainly its moderation has been consonant to the corrected disposition of the people. Crowds of prisoners issued from dungeons; the prisons became less numerous and less full; public executions were discontinued: the nation seemed to view these acts with pleasure, and in consideration of them, to consent tacitly that their representatives should throw the

blame of the whole upon the name and memory of one individual.

§ 21. It is at least within possibility, that France may be thrown into separate States and Republics. Her extent, and the discordant opinions, manners, and usages of her different provinces, afford grounds for this speculation. In such an event, I should see with concern the fate of those, who, in the career of laudable lives, have been driven from their property; but I have long thought, that in other respects the change might be compatible with general tranquillity, and with the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous commerce among nations.

The only prediction, which may be made with confidence, is, that new struggles must still take place before the agitated country under our view can attain any practicable and settled government. She has dearly purchased her new constitution, and, perhaps, has not purchased with it any thing more than the certainty of farther troubles.

§ 22. I have not pursued this topic as supposing that any form whatever of government eventually to be adopted by France for her own interior can now furnish a motive for prolonging the war against her, or even for declining to negotiate for peace, whenever the circumstances shall afford that reasonable hope of solidity and duration, which alone makes peace desirable. I can watch her revolutions without seeking to interfere in them, farther than as they appear to affect the safety of that separate portion of society in which I have duties to perform and interests to preserve: Still less am I laying the flattering unction to my mind, that there can exist in France any possible form of government, in which the jealousies and pretensions of two large and neighbouring maritime countries will not continue to supply frequent occasions of disagreement and hostility.

§ 23. It would be pardonable to have dwelt so long on the principles, temper, effects,

effects, and probable consequences of the French insurrection, if I had been merely carried forwards by a spirit of investigation, and a desire to pursue an eventful period of history, in which a few years have given the experience of whole centuries; it is impossible not to feel a peculiar interest in the miseries of a people, of whom our ideas were so different in the gay and splendid days of their attachment to their late monarchy; and surely, although there were imperfections and abuses in that monarchy, it was consistent with every improvement that can enliven and embellish society, with much individual happiness, and great national prosperity.

§ 24. But I have a greater and graver object in view. I must, however, make one previous remark respecting the actual disposition of surrounding nations to hold in disgust and abhorrence the principles of the French revolution. The continuance of so salutary an impression, or the promotion

tion of it (if its existence should be questioned) must depend entirely on the manner in which the war may be closed. If France cannot be prevented from closing it on conditions which may hold her up as having accomplished the subjugation of other countries, and a permanent aggrandizement to her own comparative weight in the general scale of power, it will be in the nature of man to estimate her principles by their final result, and the popular effervescence may recur with a rapidity beyond the power of language to describe. This whole consideration is deeply connected with the farther propositions which I shall now proceed to state.

The inferences to be deduced from the exhausted finances of France, from the decided inferiority of her naval strength, from the as yet unsettled position of her government, and from the moderated temper of her people, are all preparatory to the following question:—How far may it be consistent with wisdom for these kingdoms to seek or
to

to accept any close of the war, unless it can be accomplished on terms, which, on balancing the relative state of power, shall restore and secure the safety and independence of Europe, and, above all, provide for the naval and commercial interests of these kingdoms ?

In discussing that question, which occupies the thoughts of many, I shall say nothing of the campaign of the present year, nor of the farther operations which may be expected from our allies, or from the forces which are now going to the West Indies : I put such discussions out of my view at present, and will merely remark on the object last adverted to, that it may contribute essentially to the means of closing the war with advantage.

I am content to argue, even on the hypothesis that our allies in the war are either conquered, or worn out, or withdrawn, or so circumstanced, that they afford no reasonable hope of farther aid or concurrence ;
that

that all prospect of success on the eastern or northern frontiers of France is lost ; that our continental exertions (and expences) are or ought to be suspended ; and that the several European Powers will either make a forced peace, maintain an interested neutrality, or pursue inefficient hostilities, according to their necessities, speculations, and faculties. On the other hand I assume, that England possesses a great naval superiority, I will farther suppose (without admitting it till we see the issue of the meeting of the new legislature) that France has now a Government capable of maintaining the accustomed relations of peace and amity ; and (which is more probable) that the French leaders are disposed to treat for peace. In this predicament, feeling the pressure of the public expence ; feeling that the country is desirous of peace ; and considering the high price of the necessaries of life, to the general scarcity of which the war certainly contributes, though in a much less degree than is commonly supposed ; knowing also that

there are certain bounds, beyond which our resources cannot be forced without danger; I ask myself whether it is expedient to treat for peace, and on what general outline and stipulations it might be expedient to conclude a peace.

§ 25. To the first of those questions I answer, that it is the duty of those who conduct the war to treat for peace whenever negotiation can tend to any probable good. The system of the French government (whatever may become its particular form) is no longer likely to be an obstacle to negotiation; besides, the modes are infinite by which two nations at war may sound each other's disposition without humiliation to either. The concluding is a very different consideration, to be decided only by a due estimate of the conditions attainable, and of the consequences if those conditions should be rejected by us.

The extent of the French claims as the price of pacification is now known; If we
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are to suppose that their leaders will adhere to what they have professed in their late decrees, I cannot hesitate to say, that the preponderance; which our accession to those claims; or to any considerable part of them, must give to France; unless an adequate compensation in some other shape can be secured to us, would be dishonourable, and exhibit us to the present age and to posterity as submitting to have the law prescribed to us by our enemy.—And what law? The sacrifice of Powers that have been the most nearly connected with us; the direct or indirect annexation to France of all the ports of the continent from Dunkirk to Hamburgh; an immense cession of territory; and, in one word, the abandonment of the independence of Europe.

And yet we see and know that the people thus prescribing to us are without any established constitution; distracted by popular convulsions; in a state of irretrievable bankruptcy; without commerce, except in the exportation of coin in return for provisions,

visions, ammunition, and naval stores; with their principal ports blockaded; and without a fleet that can venture to face one of our detached squadrons. Our prospects are essentially better; if we have resources and firmness, are better than they were twelve months ago; and the disadvantages, if we give way, will be certain, immediate, and boundless.

It is true, that by giving way we might have some of the benefits of a temporary peace. The exhausted state of France might not permit her to avail herself immediately of her new advantages; but the evident precariousness of our position would be such, that we must continue to maintain the preparations and expences of war. Unhappily it is the incorrigible policy of neighbouring states to lower and distress each other; and it is impossible to convince mankind that their prosperity is best promoted and secured by the prosperity of all around them. When, however, a pacification takes place between two settled governments, an exhausting contest may be followed by an interval of unequivocal

unequivocal tranquillity ; and this has often been the case between England and France, though the intervals have been short ; but in the instance which I have hypothetically described, no such interval could be expected.

§ 26. On the whole view of our respective situations, and after making to France a full allowance for all her continental advantages, and considering at the same time our acquisitions and prospects, and the comparative state of circumstances, we are entitled to require, that the French armies shall be recalled within their old boundaries ; that Europe, in the general effect of arrangements, shall be replaced as nearly as may be on the same balance as before the war ; and particularly with respect to the naval and commercial interests of these kingdoms, that France shall not have obtained, in the result, any new means of preponderance. In order to arrive at such an adjustment, and particularly in the eventual discussions relative to possessions separated from the continent

of Europe, much must depend on explanation, and on reasons of mutual and relative convenience.

§ 27. All the advantages of war are at present with England, considered as an insular naval power, and separated as she now stands from the rest of Europe; separated not by any fault of her's, but by the fate of war, and by the fault of others.

As the war is at present circumstanced, its expence to us may be greatly contracted: England may gain much, and risks little; she has the prospect of ruining still farther the reduced commerce and naval power of her rival.

But if the other countries, which have been overwhelmed by the torrent from which we have escaped, were to be left entirely to their fate, and if all the considerations of honour and territory were out of the question, it might still be doubted how far Great Britain could hope to stand alone as a rich and prosperous nation.

§ 28. It

§ 28. It is not easy to draw inferences from the real or supposed interests of France; all her activity has long tended to her own misery, and to the misery and alarm of other states. At the same time I cannot shut my eyes against this glaring truth, that the want of indispensable articles of subsistence and of money, and the whole pressure of her interior circumstances, may soon make a return to peace not only desirable, but necessary to her.

If the French leaders are sincere in trying to settle a constitution upon principles of mixed democracy and aristocracy, they cannot be ignorant that a large standing army is incompatible with such a constitution; and they well know, that the proposed aggrandizement can only be maintained by a large standing army. The experience of ages has shewn, that large armies, which always form a sort of separate state, yield a precarious obedience to popular authorities. How far the new constitution is maintainable either with or without

out a large army, is another consideration which at present I shall put aside. It was the established army which destroyed the monarchy; it has since been employed to overawe the democracy, and, perhaps, will at last prove fatal to the whole visionary speculation of an indivisible republic of thirty millions of inhabitants, extending from the Lower Meuse to the Pyrenees, and from the Rhine to the Atlantic.

§ 29. It cannot be unknown to France, that any cession of the conquests in question must be extorted by a severe compulsion; and that if any powers have, during the war, given way to her claims, it has been on the spur of a real or supposed necessity, or from some motive less calculated to inspire confidence. It may be an immorality in politics, but national cessions of importance are never made without a secret hope that some occasion may arrive for wresting them back again.

When

The French answer to these reasonings, that nature has pointed out the Alps, and the course of the Rhine and of the Lower Meuse, as the eastern and northern boundaries of the French empire: if by nature is meant Providence, (or, according to the last invocation adopted by the Convention, "The Genius which presides over France,") there is neither religion, nor sense, nor modesty, nor morality in such a pretension; it might with equal propriety be said, that nature has pointed out the Baltic and the borders of Siberia.

I will not make so harsh an insinuation, as that all the pacifications hitherto concluded by the different powers, which were engaged in the war, are false and hollow; but any man who knows even the superficial interests of states, and who looks at the cessions of Maestricht, of Breda, of Helvoet, of Cleves, of the Spanish moiety of St. Domingo, of Rheinberg, and of Mannheim, knows well that such cessions are

either to be compensated by the effect of secret articles, or that they will be resumed whenever the resumption becomes practicable.

§ 30. It is evident, that some of the conquests of France, under the union which she proposes, would be sources to her, not of wealth, but of expence. It is in most cases improvident to appropriate what cannot be retained without an incessant exertion. Countries speaking a different language, attached to different customs, and influenced by jarring interests, may be governed by force; but it will be an unsure subjection: it might even be doubted, whether the Polish partitions will not ultimately recoil on the great powers concerned in them, and prove that they are as irreconcilable to political wisdom as they are to morality.

Will it be answered, that if these positions are true, they prove only that we ought not
to

to object to France retaining her conquests, because the conquered countries will embarrass her, and probably rise against her? my reply is, that tho' it may be unwise on the part of our enemy to contend desperately for an equivocal advantage; on the other hand we ought not, in the position in which we are, to leave even doubtful a speculative aggrandisement of such extent; and to wait in an imperfect and expensive state of peace for casual advantages in the explosion of new troubles,

§ 31. In the conclusions to which I am tending, I assume that France is not to remain in a state of anarchy; and if she can obtain a practicable constitution, even for a limited period of time, she will be in a condition to re-establish the accustomed relations of peace and amity; she will at the same time acquire an interest in those relations far beyond the importance of costly and offensive conquests. It is incumbent on her to advert to the repair of her fi-

nances, and to the pressure of those milliards of assignats, " which" (in the words of one of her committees) " have left nothing in the country but misery and paper." What is to become of those milliards, a few months more must decide. Some other means must be adopted. We may wait with decisive advantage to learn what those means may be, if in the interval we cannot attain just and honourable terms of pacification. It is farther indispensable for France to advert to the re-establishment of her agriculture, manufactures, and commerce ; I may add, to repair her population ; for I should not exaggerate if I were to assert that she has lost at least three millions of inhabitants by the effects of the insurrection and the war.

Above all, she will find in peace the only hope of emerging from that scarcity of sustenance, which (from whatever cause derived) keeps all her populous towns under the pressure or menace of a famine.

If the war continues, the dearth will extend itself even to the productive countries
of

of the Palatinate, of the Austrian Netherlands, and also of Holland. We know that though Amsterdam was, by the effect of her position, the greatest corn market in Europe, the Dutch provinces did not produce a sufficiency even for their own consumption ; their intercourse with the Baltic, during the whole of this year, has been interrupted by the war, and will now be suspended by the winter.

§ 32. The consideration last alluded to is certainly become of serious moment to this kingdom also. It has been said, and the opinion goes forth, that the scarcity and high price of all the necessaries of life are in some measure caused by the war. Subject to certain explanations, this assertion may be true with respect both to Great Britain and to all Europe. With respect however to Great Britain, it is to be remarked that large bodies of our infantry and cavalry have, during a space of more than two years, been maintained upon the continent, and in a considerable degree by the produce of the continent;

tinent ; nor must we forget the aid derived from the numerous cargoes of provisions which have been seized in their passage to the French ports. In a general view, the dilapidations and waste of war are certainly great. The consumption made by men assembled in armies and in fleets is much more than the consumption occasioned by similar numbers in peaceful occupations. The waste which happens in great stores and magazines, and in ships of war and transports, the interruptions given to agriculture, the ravage and destruction of crops by the march and maintenance of large bodies of cavalry, are all in some degree operative causes of scarcity ; but we are not to infer that those causes would be removed by a pacification. Unless the conditions of that pacification were such as to establish a real tranquillity and confidence among mankind, the evils resulting from military preparations, and naval equipments would be prolonged ; and so far as this kingdom is separately affected by those evils, they would be increased by
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the facility opened to the hostile ports of Europe to receive cargoes, the importation of which may be directed to the aid of these kingdoms and their dependencies whilst the war continues.

In truth, a principal cause of the present scarcity of bread-corn in Europe is to be found in the extraordinary and frequent recurrence of bad seasons in the last eight years: and though the present season has given an abundant produce of some kinds of grain, and of other articles of nourishment, and such as will remove all danger of famine, I am apprehensive, from the best enquiries and observation in my power, that the crops of wheat, collectively taken, will not amount to what is called by the farmers a medium crop.

It is well known, and has been ascertained, that, “ with the exception of barley
 “ only, this country, which in former times
 “ produced more grain than was necessary
 “ for its inhabitants, has, during the last
 “ twenty-five years, been under the necessity
 “ sity

"fity of depending on the produce of fo-
 "reign countries for a part of its supply."
 There is reason also to believe, "that, in or-
 "dinary years, the produce of corn in Eu-
 "rope is not more than equal to the con-
 "sumption of its inhabitants." When,
 therefore, wars and commotions, and their
 wasteful consequences prevail; when the
 seasons are bad; and farther, when the Eu-
 ropean competition for supplies from the
 harvests of North America becomes such as
 greatly to raise the prices, and even to create
 a demand beyond what that country can fur-
 nish, we cannot be surprised at the diffi-
 culty which has taken place. It is just
 matter of regret, and a perilous responsi-
 bility, whenever the executive government
 of a country feels itself obliged to undertake
 the details of procuring food for the people,
 and to supersede the merchants, whose
 energy, and competition, and capitals, are,
 in general cases, the best and surest vehicles
 of supply; but this interference of go-
 vernment was, perhaps, unavoidable in the
 6 present

present instance, when the necessities of France had raised the prices in the distant markets beyond what the agents of the merchants could venture to give; and it seems now to be indispensable, as any sudden revulsion in the actual channel of supply from foreign ports might operate as an entire interruption for many months.

The prices might be lowered, and the danger of meeting the next harvest with empty granaries might be averted, if the people could be induced for a limited period to use with the wheat a certain proportion of the other kinds of grain. This, however, is very difficult. In the mean time, I have not a doubt that the measures which have been taken have materially contributed to lessen the danger and pressure of the greatest calamity that can fall upon nations. I shall not enter farther into a subject which must soon come under the consideration of parliament; it is sufficient for my purpose to repeat, that the scarcity of subsistence is a motive which ought to operate forcibly

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with

with France towards producing peace ; and that certainly it does not affect these kingdoms in the same point of view, nor in the same extent.

§ 33. In looking to the objects of preliminary negotiation, the attention is called to the distant scenes in the West-Indies, and to the manner in which those islands should hereafter be governed.

In the disastrous and baneful character of this war, it has been the policy of the French leaders to “ generalize” (as they termed it) confusions among mankind, and to set afloat every country which they could not otherwise reduce or retain. This infernal principle has governed the whole of their measures relative to the Islands. They began by extending their citizenship and fraternity to the people of colour ; they next proclaimed a total abolition of slavery, abruptly, and without providing against the convulsions and general destruction of life and property, which so sudden a change was certain to create ; they have since proceeded

to arm the negro insurgents in a mass, and this was called “ the simple operation of
 “ purifying the colonial system of the French
 “ islands, for the purpose of accomplishing
 “ the destruction of all the British co-
 “ lonies.”

I do not mean to enter into certain questions which this recital suggests. In the opinions of some, the West India islands are the regions of injustice, cruelty, and mortality ; the grave of Europeans, and the hell of Africans : in the opinion of others, there exists neither a general unwholesomeness of the climate, nor cruelty in the condition and treatment of the slaves: whatever may be the truth in these opposite assertions, it must be submitted to the impression of time and of events.

So long, however, as we retain the valuable possessions alluded to, and in the system under which they are become an essential part of our prosperity, every consideration of regard to our commerce, of justice to nume-

rous and respectable proprietors, of protection to the planters, and of humanity to the inhabitants and to the slaves themselves, should induce us to provide for their permanent tranquillity. With that view it is essential that the several powers of Europe should have some analogy in the interior systems of the several islands which they may respectively retain on closing the war : unless this can be accomplished, or unless we can acquire, keep, and resettle the islands, which the French principles have subverted and thrown into confusion, the fermentations to be communicated between the neighbouring colonies will be great, the disagreements will be incessant, and causes even of national quarrels will arise from day to day.

§ 34. There are certain other points obviously important to be adverted to in any pacification ; but I abstain from them as they are not of a nature to form insurmountable obstacles to peace, if the greater difficulties

difficulties to which I have alluded can be removed.

§ 35. There is nothing in these remarks, which can be justly subject to the invidious charge of recommending and promoting war: I wish the blessings of peace to be as universally shared as the air which we breath; but I know that both their reality and their permanence must depend on closing the war by conditions very different from those which are described in the French decrees of the 30th September.

§ 36. We have incurred the chief expences and inconveniences of war; we have compleated arrangements of force, which, by the nature of our commerce and constitution, can never be attained without great delay and difficulty; our military establishment is high and respectable; our navy is carried to an improvement and pre-eminence in strength and skill, of which there is no example in our history; we
have

have prepared, and are sending to sea an expedition, from which it is reasonable to expect important effects: thus circumstanced it is surely wiser to prosecute the war, than to close it on conditions which would oblige us, either to continue the expence of war, or to expose ourselves to a sudden return of dangers and calamities, with the disadvantage of being unprepared for them. Let us have a peace, and not a temporary and short suspension of war; let us have a peace, such as may make it consistent with prudence to disarm, and such as may afford a good ground of social security; let it maintain the general balance of power among independent states; let it exhibit to us France herself with a government (be it of what description it may) consistent, if possible, with her own quiet and prosperity, but at any rate consistent with the safety of other countries.

§ 37. It may be said, that the rigid principles which France professes will not permit

mit her to recede from the extended line of boundaries so recently decreed by her Convention after a solemn discussion. I will not attempt to conjecture the motives of so strange a measure; but I know that it cannot have been more solemn than the repeated oaths and decrees of the constituent and legislative assemblies, never to make conquests. We have seen, in numerous instances, that the decrees of the Convention are not irrevocable; it is unnecessary to carry the recollection farther back than to the treaty with the Royalists and Vendéans, which promised to them a large indemnity, and other conditions applicable only to independent powers; and all this after repeated decrees never to treat with them, but to exterminate them.

§ 38. In treating of the termination of the war, humanity and justice suggest a wish that, whatever may be the modifications of territory and dominion, the principles

ciples of the *status quo ante bellum* might, by the returning justice and generosity of France, be extended to individuals and to families, who, in the course of these troubles, have quitted their country ; but in stating this, I do not persuade myself, that such a measure would furnish, for any long period, new and efficient links of friendship on the part of France towards England.

§ 39. It is the nature and fate of most contests, that, though the provocations are multiplied by the events which take place, the passions and sense of resentment are lowered by the lapse of time, and thus every war has its period, at which both parties begin to sigh for peace ; that moment is perhaps approaching ; but the difficulty of adjusting a pacification is at present very different from what it was in former wars. We must meet the difficulty ; and in the mean time we must moderate the inconsiderate eagerness of those, who, hav-

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ing reprobated the war from the first, without regard to its necessity, now call for an immediate peace, without regard to the attainable conditions or consequences ; on the other hand, we must not be hurried forward by the doctrines of those who think it essential to restore the French monarchy ; we must promote that sort of spirit, which is equally distant from an undue impatience for peace, and from an obstinate perseverance in pretensions not to be maintained.

§ 40. It is a weak argument, but it will be said, that we ought to make peace, because several powers of the late coalition have made it, and because others may, perhaps, be expected to withdraw themselves in like manner from the war, and upon grounds and stipulations, which abandon and renounce all the objects of our contest. It often happens that these great coalitions, even when formed and supported by the most honourable sense of public expediency, fail to produce, in counsel or in action, all the effect that was ex-

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spected from them; and with respect to the powers alluded to, I must repeat, that their disposition and views are not to be inferred from the treaties which they have signed: some of those treaties contain the seeds of future hostilities; others of them imply nothing more than a truce, or temporary repose from war; at the utmost, they are the partial pacifications of separate princes, and in no degree embrace those principles of general policy, to which it is essential for us to advert, if we mean to restore peace, or even the semblance of peace, to Europe.

§ 41. I see with deep concern the ravages which Europe has suffered, and the dangers which still prevail; there is, however, nothing radically discouraging in our position; if there were, a want of firmness would tend to make that position worse than it is: the whole closes in this single point; “the expediency of bearing and risking something more for the hope, prospect, and essential purpose of restoring general peace on secure and permanent grounds.”

I have attempted to argue, that such a close of the war is for the advantage even of France ; but if it were not, I contend that it is better for her to make peace in the manner described, than to continue the war. If, however, she should not accede to either of these opinions, I insist that it is incumbent on this country, and essential to her safety, and perhaps to her existence, to maintain the struggle. I conceive that she may maintain it with a diminished expence, with little hazard or detriment, and with a prospect, at no distant period, of resulting and compensating advantages. In this persuasion, and in the confidence that we have the fortitude and the means to encounter the difficulties which surround us, I feel a pride and satisfaction in thinking that England, by maintaining with firmness principles of sound policy, will stand successfully the bulwark of nations, of social order, of rational liberty, and of religion.

§ 42. The rapidity of these remarks and inferences may have led me to use expressions,

sions which on revision I may wish to modify and correct; I may also have fallen into repetitions amidst the complicated and recurring objects of such an enquiry; I trust, however, that the impression of what I have urged will be taken from the whole, and not from detached passages.

It is possible that some unforeseen vicissitude may overset the entire fabric of my speculations, or even that, in the eventful course of the French agitations, the whole consideration may be varied whilst I am writing these pages. The rise or fall of an individual will alone sometimes change all the views and principles of political negotiations and of states. Still, however, such of my positions as are founded in truth will remain unshaken, and will be more or less applicable to the new objects of policy, expediency, or necessity, which may present themselves. In the mean time it is better to reason from what exists, than from endless conjectures as to what may happen.

F I N I S.

A
SUPPLEMENT

TO SOME

REMARKS

ON THE

APPARENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE WAR,

In the Fourth Week of October, 1795;

OR,

REFLEXIONS

ON THE ONLY MEANS OF TERMINATING

THE WAR.

“ The strange whole purpose of their lives, to find,
“ To make, an enemy of all mankind.” POPE.

durum,
fed levius fit patientia,
quidquid corrigere est nefas. HOR.

London :

Printed for the AUTHOR, and sold by JOHN STOCKDALE, Piccalilly.

1796.

[PRICE ONE SHILLING AND SIXPENCE.]

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ERRATA.

Page 1, line 21, dele *be*; page 2, line 13, for *agreeable to persufion*, read *agreeable to this perfuafion*; page 4, line 24, for *people*, read *nations*; *ibid*, line 27, for *tell*, read *foretel*; page 7, line 30, for *let*, read *left*; *ibid*, last line, for *legged*, read *laid*; page 11, line 16, for *would*, read *should*; page 15, line 32, for *order*, read *ardour*; page 20, line 25, for *are*, read *have*; page 21, line 1, for *powrs*, read *treaties*; page 22, line 31, for *and of course are*, read *and who of course is*; *ibid*, line 32, for *they are*, read *he is*; page 24, line 8, for *population*, *can*, read *population, it can*; page 33, line 30, for *charge*, read *change*; page 39, line 10, for *people*, read *nations*; *ibid*, line 11-12, for *biographical*, read *topographical*; page 40, line 21, for *is it*, read *it is*; *ibid*, line 22, for *?*, read .

determined, well known, in order that they may not be at a loss where to rally, without danger of mistake.

Robbers speak likewise of honourable protection; Atheists of their religion; Anarchists proclaim laws; Revolutionists have invoked the rights of nations; the Convention itself has spoken of public morality; wherefore, I cannot easily believe, that metaphysical ideas are of any use to convey persuasion to the people. To produce such an effect, great examples, and illustrious names are necessary.

The French Revolution would never have acquired so much strength, if the leaders of it had remained within the narrow and obscure circle of their first ideas of Reform and a Constitution.

But the system that has arisen since, upon the ruins of Monarchy, however abominable for its bloody measures and horrid principles, bears a much more celebrated name than the ridiculous embryo of the Legislators of 1789, which name must have acquired a much greater influence over the public mind than the enigmatical equivocal Constitution, that monstrous and ephemerick production, which became an object of contempt to other nations, and of horror to the French of every description. *Live the Constitution*, has never been other than the clamour of derision, and philosophical contumely has been constantly seated on the lips of the most ardent panegyrist of that Constitution. Illustrious exam-
ples

ples and great talents, on the contrary, have unfortunately ennobled in History the Republican horrors, and the cry of *Live the Republic*, has too often been echoed with glory in the annals of the world. Indeed, the bloody anarchy which pollutes and disgraces France, has no other character of a Republic, but the mere appellation. But what more is required by the generality?

What then shall we oppose to the wild delirium of Republicanism? Shall we resort to the obscure and uncertain system of a Constitution, in which its authors themselves will continually find alterations necessary? What shall we oppose to Republican fanaticism, which glories in regicide and parricide, the most shocking of all crimes, from the two highly celebrated example of Brutus? Shall we admit the wretched and contemptible Charter of the Rights of Man? Lastly, what shall we oppose to licentiousness, irreligion, and atheism, upon which these modern Encelades wish to found the edifice of their Republic? Shall it be the severe and coercive regulations of a morality without basis, of a religion devoid of power? No; since the French nation, in the course of its disastrous irregularities, is arrived at the highest point of political and irreligious corruption, it can only be restored to health and life by being brought back to the salutary Government which was so long productive of its happiness, elevation and glory. Only by recalling to the hearts of Frenchmen that
innate

innate love for Monarchy and their Kings, can they be rescued from Republican illusions. Only by tracing back to their memory their fourteen centuries of loyalty and happiness, can they be undeceived, and discover all the deception of those brilliant hopes, with which their new Legislators have deluded them. It is to the purity of the Lys, that the French, tired with the filthy colours of the Rebels, are to be recalled. There is no other means of pulling down the infamous Idol to which they prostitute their incense, but a restoration of their former God and worship.

The human mind in general, and that of a lively and ardent nation in particular, is by its nature more liable to pass from one extreme to another, than to remain within an uncertain medium, impossible to be maintained when violent commotions take place.

Although I have candidly delivered my opinion on the only mode in which I think it possible to restore France and Europe to tranquillity, it is not my intention to judge of the propriety of such measures as have been hitherto employed. Neither have I harboured the senseless temerity of advising the Powers concerned in the present war. Nevertheless, as it is not necessary to be admitted into the Privy Council of Kings, to be convinced that it was their duty to take arms in order to oppose and destroy the audacious system of destruction which aims at the overthrow of every Monarchy; so am I also persuaded, that those
who

who held the reins of the different Governments of Europe have neglected nothing which might check the torrent of corruption that threatens social order with ruin from its very foundation; and that they have carried into execution all the measures which their wisdom considered as best appropriated to circumstances. I have wished to vindicate a measure equally advisable from justice, humanity, and general safety. I hope I may be permitted to express a desire, and to hope, that all others having been tried in vain, this will not be rejected, for which those who are the most acquainted with the spirit and character of the French nation ardently wish, as the best calculated to fulfil their expectation.

F I N I S.

A SUPPLEMENT, &c.

THE public mind, at this present moment, is employed upon the important question of a Peace. They who, assimilating this to former wars, only consider the heavy expences, blood-shed, troubles, and dangers attending, wish and call aloud for a Peace; but such as are mindful that the war was undertaken only for the protection and preservation of those interests the most dear to men, anxiously enquire, whether the intended end has been obtained. Others, who imagine the present scarcity of corn to proceed from the war, also call for a Peace, at any price, upon any terms, cost what it may. This last subject has been amply discussed in a late publication, wherein it is proved to demonstration, that, if a Peace should take place, the ports of France would then be open, the French at liberty to rove the seas, and the scarcity which is so much complained of in England, inevitably be increased, instead of being remedied. I had a French translation of that work in readiness at the time when another was publish-

ed ; however, the perusal of the book has convinced me of the propriety of the Author's observations, the solidity of his arguments, and the depth of his views ; and after having maturely considered his ideas, I venture to offer some of my own.

From the particular attention with which I have read *The Remarks on the apparent Circumstances of the War, &c.* I could not but notice the peculiar circumspection of the Author. It appeared to me that his thoughts went far beyond what he chose to express in writing ; agreeable to persuasion, I have been induced to publish such ideas as he thought proper to cast a veil over ; to elucidate those he has merely hinted ; and, of course, the object of these Reflections is to begin where he has left off.

I am not unacquainted with the reserve and prudence that are suitable to a person, in a public character ; but I know that a private individual may venture beyond these limits, without danger, or even impropriety. I am no more ignorant that there are certain points of such a nicety, that an Englishman could not be permitted to deliver his candid opinion upon them, unless in opposition to deeply-rooted national prejudices. The Author of the *Remarks* being thus influenced, is no reason that a foreigner, a Frenchman, should, especially in the present urgent circumstances.

“ Then altho’ wise I may not be,

“ The wise themselves will copy me.”

I am

I am sensible how arduous my undertaking is, how many difficulties I shall have to encounter. My reflections, if compared to those of that Author, I am convinced, will be found far inferior; but it is not my intention to enter the list as an antagonist; I only endeavour to reason from the same principles, draw such consequences as every reader must regret his having purposely omitted, for he certainly would have done them more justice than I am able to do.

Besides other prejudices will militate against me, and those I have just mentioned most powerfully; for it might so happen, that my very opinion should be construed into a prejudice.

The author of the Remarks has triumphantly obtained his chief end: he proves that it would be contrary to the interest of England and of Europe, and to the safety of civil society at large, to terminate the present war; unless, by an universal pacification, a true Peace, upon a solid and durable foundation, proper to restore the tranquillity of Europe in general, and that of Great Britain in particular. He has demonstrated, that a Peace of any other nature, would be no better than a sham Peace, a short suspension of hostilities, conducive neither to the glory or interest of England; in short, he has made it clear, that a similar indispensable treaty is not to be concluded, but with such a Power as might offer a probable security of its execution, and that

such a security is not to be expected from a nation without a government. He has also proved that France, incessantly devoured by contrary factions, which by turns have usurped a fluctuating authority, can boast of no other government, that excepted which is the overthrow of all others, *The Revolutionary Government*; that, indeed, for these two last months, a new Constitution has been established there, but the duration of this newly erected Constitution, is not so certain as to command great confidence; for we are forced to confess, that hitherto France has not been very successful in essays of this kind. "What then must be done in such thick darkness?" says the author, "wait the coming day."

But where are we to look to for the auspicious day which is to restore Europe to happiness, and re-establish social system upon its ancient basis? What shall be this creative light which shall arise over France, and clear the chaos that overwhelms it? According to the Author of the Remarks, it ought to be a system of government so calculated as to make the French a civilized nation again, recal their former connections with other people; in short, be conformable to the society of Europe.

Here begins my task; and I presume to tell that no Government of the kind can ever spring from the mire of the French insurrection.

Govern_r

Governments are to be considered as bodies, composed of certain constituent principles of *Power and Confidence, Rights and Obligations*; from which, as they are tempered by each other, arise the authority of the Sovereign, and the obedience of the subjects. It is sufficiently apparent, from their nature, that these wonderful edifices are not entirely of human fabric; that they were planned and executed from above. Several ages are employed to consolidate them; yet they may be overthrown in one single day. Therefore, it is necessary, that every system of government should be founded upon the moral basis of eternal justice, otherwise there would be no sanction to its laws, nothing could guaranty their duration, nothing secure their execution: the government at home would not be able to protect the property of the people; nor abroad to maintain its treaties. The truth of this assertion was universally acknowledged previous to the late self-created French legislators, and their repeated attempts to deny and oppose it, must have contributed to its confirmation. Notwithstanding the code which they have endeavoured to introduce, justice and sincerity will still prevail amongst men, and faithful to their sworn treaties, such nations as acknowledge a God, a witness of their engagements will continue to think themselves bound, by an oath, which can never be violated without a perjury,

Now,

Now, can it be expected, agreeable to reason, that the present rulers of France, shall have it in their power, to organize a system of government consistent with these principles, and to renew a durable intercourse with foreign countries?

They are the same men, who, openly abjured religion and morality; have trampled under-foot all that was held sacred upon earth; contemptuously laughed at their most sacred oaths and *Conventions*! Have they not made a public avowal of their design to overthrow every existing social institution? Have they not infected Europe by their perfidious emissaries?

Can it be believed that these leaders can frame a rational government; that is to say, a system founded upon justice, favourable to humanity, so calculated as to encourage morality, punish the guilty, and secure property? And that heaven will permit any nation whatever to receive such laws from their hands! No, ye men who are endowed with reason, whatever country you may belong to, you cannot believe it.

It may be alleged, that, although they are the same men, they no longer act according to their former maxims; but, have they advanced one single step towards the paths of morality? They no longer assassinate! How virtuous! This, however, is their only improvement; this is all they have done to reconcile to themselves all Europe so long incensed at the very
report

report of their atrocious crimes. I have heard, of late, the discipline which has been established through their armies, much vaunted and highly commended; but it is by no means difficult, from the numberless acts of violence that they have committed recently, when they quitted the right Banks of the Rhine, to perceive how much such converts are to be confided in.

The principles of the French Revolution have never varied since its very beginning, only in their progress. The characters are the same; the actors may be seen to dislodge and supplant one another on the moveable stage, but they continually perform the same tragedy. A similar ambition animates them; the same immorality guides them. From the time when a *Great Statesman*, who scattered the seeds of insurrection through the whole kingdom, issued a proclamation to invite a train of scribblers to deliver their opinion on the mode of assembling the *Etats-Généraux*, and sapped the foundations of the Monarchy, by forcing the junction of the *Orders* down to the last decree that shall be issued by those enemies to justice, every transaction must tend to perpetuate subversion.

The first Assembly, which was called the Constituent Assembly, the most guilty of all, since it has destroyed the mound, and let a free passage to the deluge of calamities that has inundated France; this fatal Assembly, I say, has logged the foundation of the reign
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of immorality. Perjury presided at the new formation. Regardless of their former oaths, they first contrived to degrade that religion which they had resolved to annihilate. They avowedly professed injustice, when they seized lawful property; they introduced a new doctrine of useful crimes; and of many thousand murders committed, either by their express or private commands, not one has been avenged.

It is not my intention to introduce a disgusting enumeration of the odious crimes the French Revolution has occasioned. I only sketch those of the Constituent Assembly, far exceeded by their successors, in order to trace back the spirit of the Revolution from its origin. I would wish my readers to recal to mind, that the majority of the first Assembly has formed the unanimity of the two succeeding ones;* and that in this description of monsters, from Mirabeau down to Tallien, not one single voice has been heard to speak in favour of outraged justice, or distressed humanity.

We must likewise notice how attentively they watch and perpetuate the kindled sacred fire of their abominable worship. It was first entrusted to the care of the Jacobins; in their infernal sanctuary was deposited the fatal urn, from whence were drawn the names of those who have composed the second or Legislative Assembly, and the last Convention; and of late,

* It has been said, with as much truth as precision, that the two last Assemblies were a crime of the first.

late, in order to prevent the intruding of some principle, foreign to their designs, they have rendered their new Constitution subservient to secure to themselves at least the majority of the two-thirds. They are identified; they must perpetuate confusion with which their power, if not their existence, must cease: for which reason, rather than divest themselves of their usurped authority, they have carried the decree by force of arms; in such a manner, that they are now certain the field is theirs for some time to come: but it is to be considered, that though the new Constitution may be ever so good, it can be productive of no good effect, but in proportion as the leaders will permit.

Some persons are inclined to look upon this Constitution, as a first step towards the restoration of order. They seem to hope that the leaders, tired with agitations, and overwhelmed with the difficulties inseparable from the exhausted condition of their finances, do sincerely wish to put an end to the prevailing disorder. Alas! is it possible such men can really form such a desire? Though we should be disposed to forget who they are, and what they have done, yet they cannot forget it themselves. They cannot dissemble the horror that they inspire, and we may remember many important words uttered by their own mouths upon the subject. They are no strangers to the lot that awaits them, the very moment they are no longer dreaded. They are con-

scious, that should the smallest ray of reason break forth among them, they would be frightened at themselves; and they know, that when the day of Justice returns, their final day shall be arrived.

But wherefore, may it be argued, has the new Constitution been made, unless it is to restore the appearance of a Government? To this I will answer---several reasons prevailed. First, it was proper, nay, even necessary, to exhibit a new spectacle to a nation fond of novelties, and accustomed for five years past, to exercise over its chiefs and Constitution the same spirit of fickleness, which formerly created their new fashions; and, indeed, every one must have observed, that the representation of a new Constitution has hitherto been the last night's performance of every Assembly. In the next place, they foresee the dreadful effect of the severe scourge which threatens France, and they prepare to throw all the odium on the Convention. Should this idea appear ridiculous, let me beseech my readers, in my own vindication, to remember that such a method has been tried before, and has met with success. Have we not seen the Convention ascribe to one single individual,* the atrocities that have made all Europe shudder? And yet, there was not one of those crimes, but which they all had sanctioned unanimously by their decrees. This monster sat with them; he was one of them; he had done nothing without their assistance, and if they say they have

have yielded through fear, I shall answer they were more cowardly, but not less culpable. The Convention now being divided into two Houses, it will be still more easy for them to make the Convention, assembled in one house, answerable for all the calamities that are ready to burst upon France. They will seize this one chance of avoiding the fury of a people made frantic by hunger; besides, it will be a means of pointing out and committing other victims.* Lastly, by this method they flatter themselves with the hope of re-inforcing the party that supports them in England; to make the English averse to the war; and to overthrow the Minister who would refuse to enter into a negotiation with a Nation, whose manners are become so meek, and are no longer to be reproached with not having a Constitution. They consequently have settled the important and only object of their mission, without offering to examine it closely. For three years, without interruption, or giving it a thought, they have been busied with plunder and massacres, but in less than three months time, with great confidence, according to the report of one of their committees, they have decreed a compleat system of Government, which is to repay France for all it has cost the country.

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However,

* Thus, by exacting a forced loan of 600 millions in specie, they point out to popular fury all those who, though possessed of landed-property, will not find it possible to procure the sum wanted to discharge their tax.

However, a general Peace would be as hurtful to them, as the separated treaties they have concluded were useful to deceive the people, and feed their hopes.

They are so thoroughly convinced of this being a real fact; that, when at the summit of their triumphs, they did not hesitate to decree they would maintain all their conquests, by incorporating them with their immensely extensive Republic; that is to say, that they have decreed conditions of Peace entirely unacceptable, or rather a war without an end. If they go on with it, are they not to apprehend, lest their starving armies should disband themselves, and revolt against them? Should they make a Peace, the same dilemma will still exist; scarcity is not removed; and, moreover, they will be exposed to the brutal activity of their troops, long since accustomed to plunder, not to mention the pretensions of the Chiefs, desirous of retaining their wonted command. The Author of the Remarks very properly observes, that a numerous army being incompatible with a Constitution, established upon a mixture of Democratical and Aristocratical principles, the return of Peace would compel them to make a great reduction of the army, an operation not easily to be managed, without great danger, so long as any relics of Royalism shall remain in La Vendée, where the dissatisfied soldiers will flock as to a rendezvous.

But

But there are some circumstances in which all measures are equally bad ; desperate circumstances for instance, such as that in which the chiefs of the French revolt, find themselves. Loaded with crimes, and surrounded by ruins, within or without, every thing is equally inimical to them.

It requires no prophetic inspiration to foretel, that this new Constitution will meet with the same fate as the rest. I even think myself authorised to say, that if France is never to receive a Constitution but from the hands of those who have framed the preceding ones, that unfortunate country will be doomed to endless anarchy.

Neither those who have sapped the foundations of the former Government, nor those who first dared to lift up their sacrilegious hand, against the capital of the edifice ; neither those who have completed the demolition of its ancient fabric, nor those who have scattered its ruins will ever restore it. No ; and may Heaven be thanked for it. Neither philosophers, nor the members of the first Assembly, nor those of the second, nor the régicides of the Convention, shall ever give a Government to France. I have given the reason why, and if I must repeat it, a Government requires at least such a portion of morality, and such principles of Justice and Religion, as may afford a security that it shall hold its compacts inviolable ; and it also must be invested with an authority, sufficiently powerful and respected

ed to support it : and I will likewise be bold to declare, though it may provoke the laughter of our modern legislators and fabricators of Constitutions, that the worst of all existing Governments would be the most wonderful prodigy, were it the work of such a set of men.

Were, therefore, the authors of the new Constitution, endowed with all the instruction and wisdom that are requisite to erect a moderately good Constitution for twenty millions of men, which they certainly are not, I should think it no less improbable, it should be framed by them, than that if another *Æneid* should be composed by the types of a printing house, scattered at random in the air.

If we open the History of the Revolutions of Europe, what do we find there ? Ambition, seconded by force, frequently successful in tearing the sceptre from the lawful Sovereign : but ambition was ever very careful, not to entrust it to the multitude. Whenever this latter has been possessed of it; crimes and dissensions have alternately prevailed, and in this wide circle of disorder, misery starts at each point of the circumference, repose cannot find its place.

Which is the sovereign power in France at present, that of the legislators, or that of the army, no one can determine. The former have made every possible sacrifice to the latter; which, in return, has done every thing for them; but it is not yet decided with which party the benefit of this combination is to remain

main at last. The uncertainty may continue as long as the agitation remains: but, let us suppose the return of tranquillity should take place: no one would consent to give up his advantage; each would contend for the ascendancy; this new struggle would be productive of fresh calamities, and delay the restoration of order.

I will go farther, let it be admitted, that they succeed in establishing any Government whatever, they can never be empowered to put it into motion; for if the enacting of laws requires a rich fund of morality, their enforcement demands still more, and bayonets are not the only intermediate connection between the chiefs and the subjects of a Government. At the time the first Constitution was established, France had not yet to lament a general overthrow: a dutiful obedience to the laws was still unimpaired, and yet that Constitution, though of a short existence, was despised and disregarded before it was abolished. What then is to be expected at present; when all the springs are broken, and every bond loosened? So long as the rulers are only intent on doing evil; their power will be unlimited; they are certain of being punctually obeyed, often anticipated. Patriotism may be carried to the highest degree of effervescence, but if the question was to re-establish order, to check licentiousness, to repress violence and plunder, to dictate sacrifices---the order of action would be converted into frozen inactivity. Let the best
of

of all Governments be taken into consideration: how numerous the obstacles and difficulties that bar the efforts, and oppose the wise measures of a beloved Monarch, seconded by a skilful Minister! How ineffectual and unable then must a Government be, when administered by men who are proficient only in the art of destruction.

But, even admitting that this new Constitution should be established, and in some measure consolidated, it would still be necessary to enquire, 1st, Whether there is any probability that such a Government shall be adequate to the maintenance of the customary alliance and amity with other nations? 2dly, Whether this is the only end that Europe had in view when the war took place? 3dly, Whether it would be conformable to its interest and glory to make a Peace under similar circumstances?

Should the nature of the new Government of France be disposed to admit of the compacts, common to other States, at the moment of its formation, it appears so very uncertain, it is not to be trusted: so long as experience has not confirmed it, there exists little more than a probability; and yet how frail this probability!

When we reflect on the moral character of those who are possessed of the ascendancy in France, dictate laws, and are at the helm of Government, and if we call to recollection with what rapidity the factions and systems have succeeded each other, it is difficult to perceive
what

what a security they can afford for the stability of their treaties.

Have they not torn away all the bonds which united them to other nations? It is a fact, that they have not even at present, a common language with other people; for not to mention the alteration of the Calendar; and other singularities, which draw a line between them and the rest of the world, how is it possible they could make themselves understood, since they no longer attach to words the same moral ideas as they convey to other people. These truths are so evident, that no man would wish at the present time, to entrust either his property, safety, or honour, to the justice and humanity of French integrity: considerations of more weight, require still more caution.

They who account morality nothing, and interest every thing, will not fail to object with Machiavel, that the relations of Governments with each other, have no true harmony, but that which results from the accord of their different interests: but I appeal to the judgment of all ages; this accord could not exist for one single moment if interest was its only regulator; if a sentiment of equity was not employed to moderate and prevent its irregularities; if it was not for a faithful observance of treaties, which has ever been considered as a sacred bond that unites nations, and prolongs those intervals of peace, which constitute the happiness of the world, society would have

been annihilated long since ; the war of interest would have destroyed the whole population of the earth.

The usurpers of sovereign power in France, from the beginning of their reign, having, on every occasion, shamefully violated public Justice and the Rights of Nations, the safety of Europe would, indeed, be exposed to great hazards, were it left to depend on the observance of their treaties.

It is impossible to speak of those worthless men, without recollecting their crimes, so intimately connected is the idea of guilt with their names : it is even tedious and disgusting to me, to mention so often their immorality, and contempt for public faith. Truth, when so evident and so well known, seems to loose of its value ; it is neglected, because it is too common ; it is overlooked, because it is too plain.

But in this present case, the facts, which ever stand as the best proofs, are so numerous, and so intimately connected, that they have wearied our attention, and it is disagreeable for us even to give them a thought ; however, we must support truth so long as it is attacked.

Let us suppose farther, that the new Government of France should be so consolidated as to maintain political relations with other States ; would the salvation of Europe ensue ? Is the radical security of Europe dependent merely on simple compacts ? And was there no other end in view, when Europe flew to arms.

If

If the only purport of this war has been to repel the aggression of an unjust and senseless enemy, nothing would be more natural than to make a Peace, the moment he is compelled to retreat, and to sue for Peace. If this war had been intended for conquests, it might be terminated, without impropriety, as soon as those conquests are achieved and secured.

The French leaders are too desirous of enjoying the benefit of their crimes, not to accept of a Peace, were it offered ; and, if without enquiring into their moral incapacity, the Belligerent Powers will be satisfied with the theory of any government whatever, for the security of its continuance, this the new French Constitution may procure: But, in order to become well acquainted with the motives from which this war originated, it will suffice to recollect the danger that threatened Europe, when alarmed by the progress of revolutionary doctrine. These motives already recorded in the manifestoes proclaimed by divers nations, have also been eloquently discussed in both Houses of Parliament, and are collected in the Declaration of his Britannic Majesty, of the 29th of October, 1793. We may read there, in express terms, that the object of the war, is
 “ not only to defend his own rights and those
 “ of his allies,---not only to repel the unjust
 “ aggression which he had recently experi-
 “ enced, but that all the dearest interests of his
 “ people imposed upon him a duty still more
 “ important---that of exerting his efforts for
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“ the preservation of civil society, as happily
 “ established among the nations of Europe.”

Is it because the wound now gapes wider, that it is to be thought it will heal sooner? Europe must either humble itself before France, and acknowledge its impotency, in stopping the menacing contagion, or subdue the monster against whom it has taken arms.

There are some few Governments, I know, that notwithstanding the conviction of the importance of general interest, seem to neglect it, and to commit it entirely to the care and protection of those who are more capable of succeeding in the attempt; but let not their motives be misconstrued. This involuntary avowal of their insufficiency and inferiority, ought to be interpreted as an homage paid to the strength and good principles of those Governments, which Europe looks up to for support and redress; neither is it possible that those who are entrusted with a similar confidential charge, can betray their exalted and great responsibility.

It would not be the first time, that civilized nations in Europe are become the prey of Barbarians; it, therefore, is not to be wondered at if some Princes, from fear of seeing them invade their dominions, and in order to drive them back from their frontiers, which they were not able to protect, have concluded separate treaties; but these particular negotiations, the offspring of urgency, do not associate their authors to the political body of Europe.

Europe. These powers are destitute of a character to secure their duration. But, that all the Kings of Europe, after having formed a coalition in order to chastise the rebels, should solemnly unite to legitimate their revolt, and that the irreconcilable enemies of mankind at large, those determined conspirators against the order of society, armed with hostile principles, and who, instead of waving the olive, brandish with their bloody hands the weapon of confusion, should dictate or even be granted terms of Peace, would be unparalleled in the annals of the world. Europe, subjected to so disgraceful a treaty, must then close in ignominy the eighteenth century.

Should those ambitious and perverse leaders procure, by any means whatever, their revolt to be legitimated, and their authority sanctioned, they then will be ranked amongst the Powers of Europe, and their triumph will be complete; they will have obtained more than if they had effected the conquest of Europe.

However, at this present moment, their success is rapidly declining, although, for a time, this unexpected success, seconded by the favourable aid of the elements, had, in some measure, subdued the minds of their enemies; but before it is long their prodigious efforts shall have only served to hasten the manifest and irreparable exhaustion that ensures their speedy ruin.

I wonder, I must confess, at the encomiums that are sometimes lavished upon their military

tary expeditions. It appears to me that their advantages were purchased too dearly by money and blood to be admired, and likewise by too many crimes to be envied. It was naturally to be expected, that in the first moment of general alarm, their conquests should have excited surprise; yet, if we do but reflect maturely, we must acknowledge that they are far inferior to the exaggerated means by which they were obtained.

A whole generation of men, from growing youth to decrepit old age, has been dragged under their banners; hunger and terror have driven to their camps, all such as were able to lift up a musket; the manufactures, warehouses and country, were left desert for the recruitment and service of the armies: the magazines, pay and subsistence, have devoured, within five years, the capital of the whole income of half a century. The single conveyance of that heavy and formidable artillery, with which they support their battalions, costs them dearer, for any one single and trifling advantage, than the loss of a battle to their enemy. It is thus that, though often defeated, always superior in number, they will on the very next day oppose a fresh army, which is again succeeded by a third, composed of their choicest troops, which encounter an harrassed enemy, tired and weakened by two days victories, and, of course, are forced at last to relinquish the field they are no longer able to maintain. It is by those means

means that, sacrificing without regret or remorse to their frantic rage, both the resources and lives of the present generation, and the hopes and happiness of those to come, they have succeeded in spreading terror over all Europe. If there is any thing to excite astonishment and surprise, it is not what they have obtained by such measures, but rather how they were able to carry such measures into effect. It is wonderful, indeed, that a whole nation should have suffered itself to be enthralled, muzzled, and driven to be slaughtered by a set of vile and contemptible men, who continually repeated that it was from this very nation that they held their authority. History itself may be at a loss how to account for the phenomenon, whilst it will, with the utmost facility, do justice to their successes, by comparing them with their means and measures; admitting, however, that history will descend to the particulars of this war, or record it in any other terms, but as the accidental inundation of a destructive torrent.

I do not know, whether he who first advised the French to rise in a mass, thought he employed a noble expression, or conveyed a grand idea; but I may answer, that he spoke and recommended a great absurdity. Is it not evident, that by this strange metamorphosis of a whole nation into an army, its territory and industry are reduced to barrenness? The husbandmen, the artisans of every descrip-

description, disappear ; none but soldiers remain. Let it be considered, that, that resource which stifles every other, is the harbinger of certain ruin. When a whole people marches, in this manner, to oppose the armies of the enemy, which, though they may be ever so numerous, are never composed but of a very small portion of the population, can and must at first meet with some advantages ; but, although at the first setting off it had so powerful a superiority, it must be overpowered at last. There comes a time when this desperate situation forces it to advance continually ; the moment it retreats it is ruined, for the country which was ravaged and exhausted in its first passage, lies waste and can afford no supplies.

Though we should allow it possible, that any Government whatever can be established on the ruins of France, I yet maintain that it would be of greater importance to Europe to prevent such a shameful resurrection, than it was to stop the progress of the first disorder ; for it is evident that it would be the triumph of guilt, and likewise justify and encourage every species of crime.

We all know that it becomes necessary to negotiate with rebels when there are no hopes of subduing them, or when it would cost more blood and treasure than their submission should be worth ; but a revolution that resembles no other, either in its principles or deplorable effects, prescribes a very different conduct.

However

However odious rebellions may be, those we are acquainted with were founded upon some specious motives ; they might conceal themselves under some appearance of justice ; they endeavoured to find respectable supports : but, in France, it is rebellion with all its audacity, licentiousness in its delirium, injustice in its nudity, crime in all its horror. Other revolutions present one authority superseded by another, one form of Government substituted to another ; public order was undoubtedly shaken, but not overthrown ; social felicity suffered, but its basis was not destroyed ; there always remained some foundations of morality to support the new edifice : but, in France, justice, authority, laws, every thing has fallen a victim to the poignard of Guilt. The only right that is preserved is that of Force ; and, instead of the comforting prospect offered by Religion, they have dug the dreadful abyss of despair and annihilation.* In fine, the effect of former revolutions was confined to the only countries in which they took place ; their influence did not reach beyond their limits. How different is a revolution founded upon the ruins of social order ? Mankind at large are concerned ; the felicity of the whole world is in danger.

Some persons pretend that the French revolutionists have renounced their former

* This is the sense of the inscription they have placed on the gates of their burying grounds, in which they declare that---*Death is an eternal sleep.*

maxims, because they no longer make them the preamble to their laws. It may, perhaps, be alleged with more truth, that if they seem to pay less attention to them than formerly, it is because they know that they have not so much occasion to repeat them. The seeds are sown, they shoot silently, and Europe, if regardless of the warnings it has received, facilitates their growth and improvement, in a very short time, will reap a fatal harvest.

The nature of those maxims, their falsity, the fondness of men for fiction, the egotism of the age, every thing increases the danger. They tell those who possess nothing, that at last their time is come; and, that if they overthrow the Constitution of their country, they will take the place of those who possess something. They tell those who obey, that if they re-assume the authority which belongs to them, they will be masters in their turn. Is it to be wondered at, if such a doctrine has so many proselytes in a corrupt age? It brings into action the two most violent passions of men, the love of riches, and the desire of command. Of what advantage can it be if the promoters of this doctrine have been made sensible of the necessity of giving it up, the better to enjoy the power they have usurped. I see nothing very encouraging in that; are their principles become less dangerous since the consequences have turned to their advantage? Has their doctrine ceased to be contagious since it has been crowned with success?

cess? Are their projects less menacing, because they are more matured? The wicked ever have two aims, the unhappiness of others, and their own welfare; when the first is obtained, if their blows are less to be dreaded, their example is much more so.

Besides, so short an interval, cannot possibly secure Europe from the explosions of the volcano; and the only means of preventing its continual threatenings is to extinguish it in its fiercest blaze.

Let us therefore repeat it again and again, since so many are inclined to forget it; the war being the most powerful mound that can oppose this eruption, it will spread with a new rage as soon as Peace shall have broken it down. The preachers of the new doctrine will appear, with a bribe in one hand and a treaty of Peace in the other. They no longer will find any occasion to have recourse to obscure principles, or to metaphysical reasonings, which are always attended with doubt and suspicion; the facts will speak for themselves; they will appear triumphant, and enriched with the spoils of those whom they have either stripped or murdered. They will be welcome and honoured as the rivals and equals of Monarchs; and it cannot be denied but that such a method of arguing is very attracting and powerful; it dazzles the eyes, and conveys persuasion to the multitude.

Such apprehensions will not seem exaggerated to a nation who long since has acknow-

ledged their reality, and who after a greater conviction of the danger being imminent, have recently decreed two new laws the better to protect their liberty from the attack of licentiousness, and to secure their Sovereign from the outrages of an enraged mob, and the dagger of the assassin.

Our fears are so well founded, that it must be evident there is not one nation in Europe, but is infected with the pestilence of French destructive principles. The contagion first attacked that unhappy country; perhaps it deserved to serve as an example, on account of the universality of its language having contributed the most to the propagation of the pestiferous seeds; but they who can imagine, and flatter themselves that the example of the calamities which desolate France, will suffice to cure the revolutionary pestilence, will be very much mistaken. Experience hath proved the contrary. A senseless populace have been, and are yet seen, in countries ruined by the scourge of the French armies to bless and deify their maxims. The sight of a man dying of the plague has never been sufficient to cure his neighbour, when first he begins to be infected himself; but it is known how pleasing such a sight is to the villains who enter the houses of distress to plunder them as soon as they are no longer inhabited.

Other nations must not persuade themselves that the dreadful example before their eyes is a certain remedy against their internal disorder,

order, or that it can prevent them from acting, in their turn, a part on the bloody stage; for, without comparing the nations of Europe to each other, their motions and manners are like their dress, nearly the same. But if we wish to know that degree of corruption which must, one day or other, occasion their decay, there are some rules which may guide our calculations; for instance, let the comparative increase of their theatres, that of the idle who throng there, be considered; let their books be consulted; also their libraries, or rather the shops of their booksellers; for there is more particularly to be found the thermometer of public fermentation.

In truth, at all times, there have been teachers of immorality, and anti-social schools; but their lessons, universally disapproved, were known in former times only by the scandal they occasioned, and were confined to the dust of the library. Now, on the contrary, those principles being renewed under all sorts of forms, they are to be found at every page of the most frivolous publication. At a time when the spirit of independence, the harbinger of rebellion prevails through every situation, the violence of the disorder is no longer doubtful, nor the necessity of applying a speedy and efficacious remedy: in a word, the revolution arising from the filth of vice which infects Europe, is the result of the most corrupt fermentation,

mentation, and on its consequences depends the fate of civil society in this part of the globe.

The better to judge of the present condition of the political body of Europe; the better to feel the state of its pulse, if I may be permitted the expression, let the slow and torpid pulsations be compared to the quick and burning delirium that agitated this part of the world in the twelfth century, when the Sovereigns and people called forth, in the same manner, as they are at present, by the united voices of Religion, generosity and honour ran in crowds to Asia. Those valourous expeditions which excited the admiration of our forefathers, are, I know, become the object of the contempt and censure of modern philosophers. They have chiefly endeavoured to condemn the motive, which history itself has ever respected, although it disapproved of the imprudence of the measures. They have represented the general enthusiasm as an exalted delirium, a political fever; but let it be so, let us suppose, that enthusiasm was a fever; it was that of honour; whereas it is much to be apprehended, lest the fatal calm that prevails at present, is the effect of gangreen, the deadly symptom of approaching dissolution.

What a moment for the nation entitled to consider itself as destined to prevent the dreadful overthrow! Though it was postponed only for a few centuries, it would reap all
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the glory of such a benefit, and share the blessings it will procure. This nation will be called the benefactress of all nations, a name that will be everlasting in the memory of men.

Sovereigns of the world, Princes or Kings, who hold those high stations, only the better to watch for the safety of the people, and to protect them from their own errors ; if at so critical a period, you should consent to compromise with the pestilence that threatens to devour your States, the decree of the National Convention of France, which invited to revolt all the wicked men of every country, would only have been the prelude of the treaty of peace that would secure impunity to them : and you, who live under the laws of liberty, if you honour it in reality, if you wish not to see it sacrificed to a vain shadow, beware how you treat with the monster that has assumed the title of Liberty. Unite on the contrary, to oppose his fatal triumphs ; for the cause of liberty shall be stained for ever, if we associate to her worship, that idol of filth, besmeared with blood, which reckons among its martyrs, every *Marat* of the present revolution. Lastly, you virtuous men of every country, who although unacquainted with the Government that protects you, nevertheless are fully sensible of its salutary effects ; you who, in your peaceful occupations, serve your country better in bringing up and maintaining citizens, destined to enrich and defend it, than all the political

political enthusiasts, who in order to gratify their vanity, endeavour to mislead your minds by all manner of illusions, and visions; if you value ever so little your own happiness, tranquillity and safety; if you regard the dearest interest of life; if you feel the least affection for your wives and children, beware of those dangerous sophists. They possess neither property nor principles: they are men of no character, or of a stained character, and they have nothing to loose in the wreck they meditate. Suffer then a little longer, if possible, the evils that are inseparable from a war, rather than call for a fatal peace that would be attended by the most disastrous consequences.

When I thus discourage hopes, which it would be so pleasing to encourage could they be realized, can I be suspected of wishing for a prolongation of the war? Is not our situation cruel enough to make us desirous of a speedy peace? Have we not long enough lived a wretched life? Proscribed and exiled from our native land, our paternal home, wandering from country to country, we can hardly find one place of refuge in the whole extent of the world, this hospitable island excepted, where every kind of consolation and assistance have been offered to us. Here, indeed, the unfortunate victims of honour, religion and duty, have found a people well acquainted with all the power of those sentiments. Here a beloved monarch has welcomed,

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with true Royal benevolence, the loyal subjects of another unfortunate Sovereign: But, is it to be expected that, even in this country, which is a second mother country to us, we can be insensible to the everlasting calamities of our first? Many are there among us who have left behind them a family, the constant object of their daily alarms and apprehensions, exposed at every minute to some new accident? Can it be believed that a Frenchman can loose all remembrance of France? His heart must bleed at every wound aimed at his country; his situation is, and must be most cruel and deplorable. The unfortunate wretch, who, upon a bed of sorrow becomes a prey to a corrosive ulcer which threatens to spread its infection through the most secret recesses of his vital powers, is forced to thank, though groaning, the skilful surgeon who applies instruments and fire itself to his mutilated body, or rather his shapeless trunk; such is now the dire fate of Frenchmen! They are reduced to the necessity of giving their approbation to every amputation their dear country undergoes.

Some great politicians, however, will tell us, that every thing must necessarily come to an end, and that we may hope to see order arise from the very bosom of confusion. A similar charge, I confess, might be the effect of a miracle; but that we should expect such an effect from the cause alluded to, I deny; for, what will those men do who are repre-

sented to us as deprived of any further resource?---What will they do? All they are capable of: evil, evil again, and evil for ever.

Since it is impossible, that from a putrified source should spring a Constitution practicable in France, or any form of Government compatible with the safety of other countries, since it is impossible to conclude at present, with France, a solid and durable Peace; since Europe will be still exposed to the same danger so long as the focus of rebellion exists there, by what means can Europe rid itself of this exhausting and ruinous war? What means remains to England to restore tranquillity to France and mankind? I know but of one, which is firmly to determine to exert its utmost efforts to re-establish the former Monarchy.

I am no stranger to the impression such a word will cause; to the prejudices it will awaken; to the apprehensions it must occasion; and to the alarms it must give to many claimants; but I will endeavour to prove that such prejudices and alarms are void of any foundation.

Whoever has heard in England any mention made of the former Government of France, must have observed, that the English have generally adopted the idea, that the French Monarchy was absolute and truly despotic. It is in vain that the greatest Monarchs have acknowledged and declared that the Constitution

tution of the State was supported and protected by fundamental laws, that they themselves were so fortunately circumstanced as not to have it in their power to change them. In vain have we seen Courts of Justice oppose, with noble resistance, the will of their Monarch, and instruct him by their humble remonstrances; in vain has the King himself submitted, in competition with any one of his subjects, for the defence of his own private interest, to the decision of the tribunals; it matters not---turbulent spirits, daring writers, ever dissatisfied with the Government that tolerates them, more jealous of being spoken of than anxious for the interest of the people, which they care little for, though they make it their pretext, are always certain of being listened to, when they recite, with some share of eloquence, the common-place phrases and reproaches that have been made, from the very origin of societies, to every Government in the world. Foreigners especially, who, when upon their travels got acquainted with these contaminators, generally welcomed their declamations; the English more than others, for in their country they are in some measure a part of the national character.

Whether it is that the English will acknowledge no other limited Monarchy, besides that from which they derive their glory and happiness; whether the opposition that has ever prevailed between the two nations, has been sufficient to persuade that the one boast-

ing of being a free-people, the other must necessarily be slaves; or whether the English nation, in order to enjoy the more its liberty, must think its rival* could not partake of similar blessings; the prejudice I have mentioned has generally been adopted in England. It is an hereditary opinion, instilled by education, and deeply engraven by time; all their travellers have repeated it; all their poets sung it; and the observing man who knows better, and might combat it, dares not attack in front this bulwark of popularity, which renders it respectable. We must then honour and be thankful to the candour of a writer who declares,† “ That although there
 “ were imperfections and abuses in that Mo-
 “ narchy, it was consistent with every im-
 “ provement that can enliven and embellish
 “ society, with much individual happiness,
 “ and great national prosperity.”

I should have nothing more to say in addition to such a declaration, if my present publication was an answer, instead of a supplement, to that I have just quoted.

Were it seasonable to discuss so important a question at present, I would ask, whether it is true, that in fact, any such Government, as an absolute Monarchy, can possibly exist? and if so, whether it can last fourteen centuries, among an enlightened people? The
 Author,

* It is to be noticed, that the greatest efforts to effect the ruin of the Constitution and Liberty of England, originated at the very moment the French began to speak of them.
 † Remarks on the Circumstances, &c.

Author who is the most partial to popular principle, has asserted, that a true democracy never has nor never will exist: might we not say the same of an absolute Monarchy? These two forms of Government may be compared to the two extremities of the ideal scale of social system, and experience has proved, with respect to all human establishments, that the imperfection of their elements compelled them to continue always in an equilibrium. Such is partly the reason why the preservation of those delicate bodies requires so much care, the space allowed to them is void of natural, and only possessed of conventional boundaries. Fury may transgress them, and violence destroy them; wisdom and moderation alone can keep within them.

But why should I wander through a metaphysical labyrinth, at a time when facts oppress us so heavily? Of little signification, is it to enquire, whether the former Monarchy was or was not absolute, when we have no choice but between that and anarchy. The question is not to know which of all possible Governments would suit France best, since, in these present circumstances, one alone can restore its tranquillity. The true object of the question, is the safety of Europe. The object is to know, whether a Monarchy that has been tried for a long series of ages, is not to be preferred to the puerile essays of the incoherent Constitution of the French Revolutionists: whether
it

it is more conformable to the interests and dignity of the Powers of Europe, to recur to this means, the effects of which are certain, or to venture to follow the new legislators in their eternal experiments, in their unintermitting delirium: whether, in case any reform was necessary, it would be seasonable in the present circumstances.* This question did not appear problematical to the English Government, when the French were invited “ to
 “ join the standard of an hereditary Monarchy,
 “ not for the purpose of deciding in this mo-
 “ ment of disorder, calamity, and public dan-
 “ ger, on all the modifications of which this
 “ form of Government may hereafter be suf-
 “ ceptible, but in order to unite themselves
 “ once more under the empire of law, of
 “ morality, and of religion, and to secure, at
 “ length, to their own country, external peace,
 “ domestic tranquillity, a real and genuine
 “ liberty, a wise, moderate, and beneficent
 “ Government, and the uninterrupted enjoy-
 “ ment of all the advantages which can con-
 “ tribute to the happiness and prosperity of a
 “ great and powerful nation.”

Would it be a stain in the annals of a free people, were it transmitted to posterity, that it has gloried in re-establishing the Government I have described? Would England no longer be the most generous nation in Europe, should it restore to a rival the only suitable,

* With regard to the advantages of reformation, the most essential have ever been necessarily produced by compulsive circumstances.

appropriated Government, though at the same time, it did not procure the same political Liberty, which does so much honour to Englishmen?

Enjoy, ye happy Islanders, the valuable benefit of your Constitution; but recollect that a limited Monarchy, in the sense you consider it, is by no means applicable to a nation placed on a continent, and surrounded by warlike people. One single reason will be sufficient to convince you, from its biographical situation, France is necessitated to keep a considerable standing army.

But, even those who insist upon the Monarchy of France being an absolute Monarchy, would not, I suppose, for that reason, prolong the war, and defer longer the tranquillity of Europe, rather than have recourse to the only means that can be productive of a solid and durable Peace.

In fact, though an absolute Monarchy is a bad Government, the people who are subjected to it are the only sufferers; its neighbours have no concern in it. The terrible Bastiles, the Lettres de Cachet, so much complained of, do not disturb its external relations with other nations. From whence then this tender and scrupulous concern for France? Wherefore should we wish to do more good to France than general tranquillity requires? Ah! let that deficient Government, which so long constituted her happiness and glory, be restored; that bad Government,

ment, under which that country became the abode of the arts and pleasures, that attracted such a number of foreigners to its metropolis and large cities. Thither travellers would go to share the sweets and luxuries of society; and though they there enjoyed the most uncontrolled Liberty, yet, on their return home, they lamented the reigning despotism.

Will it be alleged, that the vices of an absolute Monarchy, though they make the subjects unhappy, do not secure the neighbouring nations from the dangerous sallies of the troublesome ambition of such a Government? Though I should admit this, may I not reply, that such apprehensions are still more to be entertained from the inquietude and perpetually reviving agitations of a Senate, or the chiefs of a Republic? Did there ever exist a more bustling, ambitious, and troublesome people to its neighbours than the ancient Romans? Is it known that an extensive Republic must be a conquering power? If it does not expand itself without, it must be devoured within, by its internal activity.

It would not become me to pretend to give advice to the English, relative to the interest of their Commerce; but they know very well that by the last treaty, France was become one of their markets, and that it was not the least beneficial. Now the present state of its manufactures, and the long languishment of its commerce, will make the French, more than ever, tributaries to the industry of a people

nation they once emulated. It is undoubtedly a very promising prospect for England, to find in the wants of a country of large consumption, a market for the merchandize, which, since the war, has been stored in warehouses at home; and most certainly, nothing can be more favourable to this branch of exportation, than the peaceful and protecting authority of the former Monarchy.

Besides, wherefore should the pleasing idea, so agreeable to gratitude, that new compacts of alliance and friendship may succeed to the jealousy which has so long divided the two nations, be a mere illusion? Is such a division of the same utility as that of their shores?--- Why may it not be hoped, that the recollection of the tokens of concern, and the proofs of benevolence which the unfortunate French have met with in this hospitable land, will survive in their hearts, be perpetuated in the memory of their posterity, and become the implanted seed of mutual friendship between the two nations? Wherefore should we not yield to the persuasion, that the Royal Family of France, after having been reinstated in its former rights, by the endeavours and pecuniary assistance of England, will think it their duty to immortalize their gratitude, by every means of securing and perpetuating an alliance between both nations? No, never shall a treaty of peace have contained more certain evidence or tokens of the tranquillity of Europe.

Though it is afflicting to own, the prejudices of foreigners against our former Government, are less surprising, when we see them authorised by some individuals who call themselves Frenchmen: no less vain than guilty they calumniate, in their interested declamations, the Government which they have overthrown, through fear it should be restored. In imitation of Erostratus, they have acquired a name; their vanity is hurt at the nullity which has befallen them; they endeavour to make amends by intriguing, and they would wish to behold the destruction of the whole universe, rather than to see the temple which they have destroyed rise again. Though they can no longer dissemble the weakness of their schemes; they are obstinate in their opinion, and in repeating that they were necessary; and they report every where that the public opinion of the French is averse to the re-establishment of Monarchy. The public opinion! As if the people could possibly have an opinion: they want both time and faculties. The history of this world, especially that of our Revolution, furnish us with ample evidence with regard to those who are invested with the sovereign authority; and it is a strange argument to reproach the conquered party with not having on their side the blinded multitude, which always follow the triumphal car.

However, notwithstanding what may be the case in other countries, never in France have
we

we had a public opinion, properly so termed, upon what is called Political Constitution. We enjoyed, without meddling with it, the felicity productive of that to which we were indebted for fourteen centuries of existence, not unattended with some glory; yet we were not entirely indifferent to the welfare of our country, nor to the Government we lived under. With us, sentiment was a substitute for opinion. To love their King and Country was the second religion of the French. They who have planned our calamities, knew it well. It is in the King's name, that they have made the Revolution.* It is with the Royal authority that they have crushed Monarchy; but the remembrance and regret of it still remain, and five years of calamity and crimes have not extinguished this sentiment in the breast of the French. There it still survives and preserves all its power; and though the spring is compressed by fear and despair, it will exert itself, but with greater force, when it shall be capable of acting. Let us cast our eyes on that brave Royalist army, whose formation,

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existence,

* In several parts of the Kingdom, troops of peasants have been seen compelled by hired ruffians, to go, with tears in their eyes, to set fire to the *Chateaux* of the Nobility, or their Landlords. In order to force them to commit these horrible crimes, they were shewn forged orders from the King, who had sentenced, it was said, to have their Seats destroyed, the refractory Nobles, who refused to deliver the titles of their abolished revenue.

In several Provinces, and namely in Alsace, those supposed *Ordonnances Royales* were printed in French and German, and posted up,

existence, atchievements and preservation, are so many miracles. They ascertain better than any argument, what may be expected from the sacred enthusiasm of the true French towards their God and their King; and it is not to be imagined that this sentiment is exclusively to be met with in the Provinces of Anjou, Poitou, and Brittany; it needs only proper encouragement to manifest itself from one extremity of the kingdom to the other.

A handful of men who were in want of every thing, have collected under the banners of Religion and Royalism; forced to conquer, even before they were supplied with the means; they first were obliged to fight for arms. Their artillery, ammunition, and soldiers have been the produce of their victories, for a long time rapid and glorious, although they had but a small body to oppose large armies, continually reinforced and renewed. They certainly might have obtained more important advantages, had they received any further assistance, and especially as one of the Ministers of his Britannic Majesty said, when he spoke of the expedition of the Emigrants:*

“ A strong concentrated body of men disciplined, appointed, and provided before they
 “ take the field; commanded by men, not
 “ only eminent for honour and military talents, but revered for the victories and
 “ laurels

* Mr. Dundas's Speech, 17th April, 1794.

“ laurels they had won to adorn the Crown
 “ of France, fighting under the same banners,
 “ having the same object, and animated by
 “ the same enthusiasm as those of La Vendée.”

Nevertheless, entirely forlorn, without either magazines or fortified towns, sometimes defeated, once nearly annihilated, but never subdued; these firm and courageous men have maintained themselves for about three years, in the country where they were formed. They have compelled the enemy, who had taken a solemn oath to destroy them, to acknowledge their independence. They have dictated terms of Peace to those who, at this present time, wish to impose such rigorous conditions to all Europe. Every Power in Europe has heard, with concern and admiration, the report of their successes and gallant efforts; they have made vows for their future welfare; the calamities of the times have prevented them from doing more; but the effects of Royalism in France are not less evident; and by what it has performed in a small part of the kingdom, we may judge what it might operate through all the Provinces, if it dared to rear its head.

But, can we judge of the opinion of a whole nation when in a state of blindness, of intoxication, and of delirium? The fidelity of the French to a series of sixty-seven Kings, their attachment to a Monarchy which they have preserved for fourteen hundred years, are un-

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questionably of more weight, and more respectable authority than five years of dissensions, variations and troubles. They must outweigh in the balance of judgement the opinion that is to be entertained of the true sentiments of the French nation ; besides, it is known who the organs of the prevailing opinion in France have been from the beginning of the disturbances. To give credit to the reports of such instruments would be as bad as to judge of the English nation, from the offence offered to the sacred person of his Majesty the 29th of October last, or from the acts of violence and treason committed at the time of Cromwell.

Those who suppose that the people of France have really an opinion relative to the Government they prefer, do not, perhaps, mean to assert that it is in consequence of their having maturely studied the nature and details of a political Constitution. Such a knowledge is to be acquired only by a comparison of the several experiments they have tried ; but with what modesty can it be pretended that such a comparison would prove disadvantageous to the former Government ? O ye, on whom the re-establishment of France and the preservation of Europe depend ! admitting that human power can still effect these important objects ; beware, above all things, not to mistake the measures you are to employ ; beware of those impostors, who, like quacks, impudently intrude upon the dying patient, who might re-
proach

proach them with having brought him to an untimely death, to offer some new medicine; beware of the turbulent, presumptuous and incorrigible tribe of innovators. They pretend, with the assistance of their books, to make converts of the people who do not read; and, notwithstanding the dreadful catastrophe to which they themselves have fallen victims, they still continue to propose new hypothetical Constitutions, and new codes of Religion. Righteous Heaven! when will men be cured of the rage for innovation?

At a time when the most enlightened wisdom ought to distrust itself; when the most approved remedies are hardly certain enough, is there a man daring enough to propose new ones? Is there so avowed an enemy to public tranquillity and felicity, as to propose new experiments? Unhappy wretches! Behold the deplorable effects of the spirit of innovation. Behold the pitiable situation to which we have been brought in consequence of your wonderful essays, those even that have had but a transitory influence, such as the *Cour-Plénier*e, and the Assembly of the *Notables*,* a weak remedy, a bad palliative, a dangerous forerunner, and chief cause of the convocation of the *Etats-Généraux*; for the imprudence of this convocation is no longer problematical in the eyes of the man of sense, who maturely considers the state of confusion and exhaust-

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* In England they were named Not-able.

ment into which ignorant and dilapidatory ministers had plunged the kingdom.

In all probability, it will be asked, how it is possible to seduce and deceive a people incapable of forming any judgment; but it may be answered, by misleading and inflaming their minds, for which reason it is necessary to bring them back to other sentiments, when we wish to cure them.

I know that a Republican author, who has often boldly employed his pen against the Revolutionists of France, and has deplored with much eloquence, the calamities of anarchy, has said, that it had been too often and too idly repeated, that this was the cause of Kings. He has warned the powers of Europe, that they would commit a great error, if they announced a design of re-establishing the former Monarchy. According to his opinion, they ought to declare, that they have taken arms "for the defence of all ranks and
" conditions, to maintain the religion of the
" people, the authority of the laws, the sacred
" rights of nations, and the power of public
" morality." * These certainly are great and fine ideas; but are they of such a nature as to have any influence over the people? Rarely are they seen to enlist under so many banners at a time. It is better, in my opinion, to propose only one object clear, distinct, well-determined

* Considerations on the nature of the French Revolution, &c.
§ 37.

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L E T T E R
OF
A G E N E V A N
RESIDING AT LONDON,
TO
ONE OF HIS FRIENDS,
AN INHABITANT OF THE PAYS DE VAUD,
IN SWITZERLAND.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

Nam tua res agitur paries cum proximus ardet.

HORAT.

L O N D O N :

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1795.

[Price THREE PENCE.]

LETTER.

SIR,

THE generous compassion which you have shewn on account of the misfortunes of my country, of that city once the honour, but now the reproach of her citizens, conveys a grateful consolation to an afflicted heart. I am not ignorant of the kind reception you have afforded to our fugitives and exiles.—In recompense for the asylum which your hospitality has given them, may you never have occasion to seek one from a similar cause.

The example of Geneva, you say, has restored many of your own misled countrymen to their senses. I am not surprised that it has had this effect upon upright and honest minds. One would have thought that the French revolution had already told us all; but the magnitude of events upon that immense theatre imposes on the mind. The distance weakens the impression of the objects; whilst emigration, intrigues, the coalition of Princes, menaces, treasons and civil wars, conspire to thicken the mist around this great revolution. Its apologists incessantly tell you that if the people had not been provoked, if it had not been obliged both within and without to combat a formidable league, the principles of liberty and equality would have realised in France the chimera of the golden age.

But what can these enthusiasts, true or false, reply when you present them with the picture of a complete revolution within so narrow a compass as the republic of Geneva? Here were no nobles to depress, no clergy to despoil, no foreign war, no previous oppression, no ac-

tual resistance, no future danger; the people, without any exception, had obtained the supreme object of your fanatic reasoners: they possessed political equality; they had expelled all the ancient magistrates; they feasted at their pleasure on democracy; the revolutionists, possessed of all authority, rioted in power, commanded, exacted, squandered payment, and excited fear, whilst the tree of liberty exalted its unfruitful head above the ancient towers of our temples.

After having procured the triumph of their principles, in the constitution which they had but just dictated; after having given us a government as democratized as their imaginations could suggest; we ought to be tranquil, we ought to be happy, if this be possible from revolutionary principles. Mark only their effect upon us.

In the very midst of the reign of this so much boasted equality, these pretended apostles of liberty formed a conspiracy in which the popular government was secretly concerned; they snatched from their sleep and dragged inhumanly to prison a number of citizens, who relied with tranquillity upon the laws to which the revolutionary party had just given their sanction. When they submitted to them so early, they did not imagine that a new constitution, resting on the basis of liberty and equality, was no other than a snare contrived by assassins.

Not knowing what crime to impute to six or seven hundred persons who had been made prisoners in this nocturnal invasion, and during the following day; a Revolutionary Tribunal was created; or, in other words, a band of murderers was organized to judge without law, to condemn without witness, and to violate, with impunity, every thing which has hitherto been held sacred amongst men.

These judges, chosen from amongst the most zealous apostles of liberty and equality, sat in a public hall, with their arms bare like butchers, their legs naked, their breast uncovered, in red caps, with sabres by their sides, and pistols at their girdles; the examinations of the prisoners, their defence, their sentences, death, exile, imprisonment; the whole of this atrocious scene was carried

on, during seven or eight days, mixed with an infamous gaiety, which, encircled by crimes, drunkenness, and carnage, completes an infernal picture.

One point I must insist upon: *all these horrors took place after the revolution was finished.* These are the fruits which we have derived from the system of our equalizers. Neither was it the dregs of the people which committed these excesses. In this revolutionary tribunal were merchants, substantial mechanics, and lawyers; the Government which secretly favoured these conspirators was by no means composed of the outcasts of society, it contained lawyers, merchants, and men of property. The greater part, far from being villains, had hitherto been valuable men; they involved themselves in these crimes by degrees only and with repugnance: without doubt they at first opposed them, before they became the abettors; and perhaps have deplored them since; but the torrent was too strong; they were urged on by their own examples; they themselves had given the fatal lesson of using violence to overthrow the established laws; they arrived at the summit of crimes as it were in spite of themselves, by cowardice, by weakness, and under the vain pretext of preventing greater mischief. Covered with the opprobrium of their party, and with their own personal shame, they teach you how little a man can trust to the probity of his intentions when he enters into the revolutionary career.

Thus Geneva gives you a striking example which applies to your manners, your habits, and your situation. With you a revolution would be still more fatal; in the contention you would have more dangers to encounter; after the victory, you would have to experience more disasters. The system of equality was established within our walls without resistance and without a conflict; the Government itself relinquished its prerogatives, which it still was able to defend; there was only a feeble barrier of separation to be taken away between our different classes; and this operation scarcely caused a slight concussion. It is not necessary to present you with a picture of your own circumstances, which differ so much, and to calculate

what the mere preliminaries of a revolution would cost you.

But let us suppose for an instant that this revolution was not only begun, but completed, to the satisfaction of your most fanatic equalizers. From that moment, Sir, your greatest misfortunes commence; the more complete your success, the more fatal will be your divisions. Massacres, banishments, proscriptions; these will be still worse than at Geneva. You have a nobility, we had none. You have rivalships, claims and hatreds between town and town, village and village, that could not exist with us. You will have a considerable plunder in your landed properties, a plunder precisely made to tempt poor labourers, journeymen, and vine-dressers. The rich with us had the greatest part of their wealth in foreign banks, and offered little that was certain to the rapacity of our equalizers. Your factions would be supported by neighbours who would take a part in them, and you know how much this circumstance tends to inflame animosities; the distance between one town and another would very much augment the means of the agitators; they would have resources much more abundant than with us to keep the public mind continually in motion by falsehoods, calumny, and fictitious conspiracies. You see therefore, that after a revolution, the region of the Pays de Vaud would, if I may say so, be more convulsed, more *volcanic*, less susceptible of resuming its consistency than that of Geneva, and that the gulphs which here and there must remain, would require for a long time to be fed with the dead bodies of its inhabitants.

Will your disorganizers tell you that these evils are accidental and peculiar, and not the necessary consequences of a revolution? They are either insincere, or they deceive themselves most grossly. It would happen with you as at Geneva, that the people, having obtained these political powers, would soon perceive that they had not acquired any accession to their fortune; that the cessation of labour, the expulsion of the rich, and the decline of arts and commerce, had not improved their well-being; that they had laboured for a small number of leaders only, the sole per-

sons whose vanity is gratified by a revolution: thus the multitude, chagrined, discontented, deceived in their hopes, accustomed no longer to respect any thing, eagerly listen to new chiefs, to new intriguers, who wish to succeed the former, who have the same right, the same title, the same power, who hold the same language and affect the same maxims, with this sole difference, that they render them still more outrageous in order to give them some attraction of novelty. In short a revolution gives birth to a tribe of discontented persons, both in the party of the vanquisher and in that of the vanquished; one half of a nation occasions the misfortune of the other half, without having even the sad consolation of securing by it its own happiness; the honest men of the victorious faction have the humiliation of serving as instruments to the violence which they detest, and are the sport of an insolent minority, which contracts itself as it proceeds, till at length the whole power falls into the hand of one single demagogue, who, like Robertspierre, is soon more furious against his colleagues, whom he fears, than against the vanquished, whom he fears no longer.

Experience, Sir, has nothing more certain than the following. Every well regulated constitution ought to secure to every individual the preservation of his rights and liberty; it ought to maintain the sole equality which is possible, the submission of all, and even of the prince himself, to the letter of the law. But the great mass of the people enjoy but for their detriment the mere political brilliant prerogatives which are intended to dazzle them; they possess none of these powers except for the purpose of turning it against themselves; a vain appearance is left them. Their chiefs, their demagogues, are those who seize upon the reality; the people can really enjoy nothing but the laws which ensure their tranquillity, personal safety, and the freedom of industry; they are strangers to every thing besides. Power, places, eloquence, the charm of authority, the pleasure of humbling those who possessed rank, the pride of succeeding them, all this is the portion only of a very few; the multitude remain ever passive, ever obedient to the des-

pot of the moment. It is in times of tranquillity that public opinion is consulted, in times of revolution the general will is unheard.

When I consider that part of Switzerland which you inhabit, I see nothing there which does not present me with pleasing images; you are as happy as any people upon earth. If you possess not all the resources of great states, you have neither their luxury, their taxes, their wars, nor their dangers. Your ancient simplicity shelters you from the storms to which the most flourishing empires are exposed. There is not a traveller who has not been struck with the general ease of your people, the instruction which pervades all classes, the sweetness of manners, the gaiety, the tranquillity of the inhabitants, and with all the signs of a good government, which guides mankind by the confidence it inspires; nay more, you see amongst you a sensible progress towards improvements of every kind. Distrust those, I conjure you, who wish to accelerate them by force: Good and better are the slow productions of experience, but evil is generated with an alarming rapidity; an instant suffices to annihilate the labours of an age.

You have a high opinion of the wisdom of the English; respect, like them, your ancient institutions; like them distrust that political empiricism which sacrifices a whole generation to an experiment, which turns every thing into a problem, which overturns every thing without having dreamt of the means of restoring it; and what sort of a discovery has been made? What is this new philosopher's stone? Have these new politicians invented some other good besides tranquillity, safety, concord, industry, the peace of families, property, religion, morals? Will not a revolution destroy all these? What! were you happy four years ago, and all of a sudden will you be so simple as to suffer yourselves to be persuaded that you are unhappy, that you are oppressed, tyrannised over, and debased! If you were told that you had the plague, would you believe it? Would you take an emetic because your neighbour has a fever? There is a mixture of absurdity and horror in the idea of deluging a highly favoured corner

corner of the earth, because elsewhere abuses and excesses have existed, which, under the name of reform, have introduced calamities a thousand times more deplorable.

Above every thing beware of depending upon the character of those who might be at the head of the factions; that you may be preserved from the effects of their fury; they soon become depraved themselves, and incapable of quitting the vortex into which they have drawn you. I have been personally acquainted, from his infancy, with one who has had a principal share in what has passed at Geneva, since the month of July. I believed him to be good, generous, humane, incapable of injustice, or of an unworthy sentiment. I had lost sight of him for some years; but I thought that, notwithstanding the horrors with which he had lately sullied himself, it might not be impossible to reclaim him. I wrote to him on the 15th of August, as soon as I was informed of the scenes of carnage which had passed. I expressed myself with force, but without neglecting any of those managements which were compatible with the indignation which I felt. I was aware that in order to persuade I ought not to irritate, and that the question was not so much about my principles respecting what had passed for these two last years at Geneva, as about motives which might serve to separate him from this ferocious band of revolutionists. You will judge of this letter by what I am going to transcribe for you. It remains to say that it has been perfectly useless; it has not even produced an answer. I could wish by imparting it, that it may be useful at least to those who are inclined to tread in his footsteps.

“ A long and intimate friendship with the person to whom
 “ you owe your birth, and from whom you have received
 “ the most tender and enlightened attention; the affectionate
 “ interest which from your infancy I have borne
 “ towards you, and which has been further proved by the
 “ connexions we have had together, are the motives
 “ which induce me to write to you at this epoch, the
 “ most awful and solemn of your whole life. It is not my
 “ intention to discuss political topics, which are at present
 “ so far from the subject; the question is no longer about
 “ the

“ the constitution, about laws, or about liberty; it con-
 “ cerns the first sentiments of humanity, which you can-
 “ not entirely stifle. It marks the choice between a
 “ career of crimes, and a return to virtue. I have always
 “ known you frank, generous, full of honour, and eager
 “ to do good; with these dispositions, into whatever ex-
 “ cesses you may have been hurried by an enthusiasm
 “ which deceives you, or by other motives which are not
 “ more easy to be justified, I believe you still capable
 “ of making a vigorous effort to tread back your steps,
 “ and to repair as much as possible the evil which has
 “ been already done. Do not expect however, that in
 “ order to engage you to it, I shall submit to flatter prin-
 “ ciples which are contrary to my own, or attempt to
 “ disguise the horror with which I am inspired by scenes
 “ which dishonour our common country. No, Sir; in
 “ discharging towards you the duty of an old friend, I
 “ will not fully it by any dissimulation. I wish, on the
 “ contrary, to be able to shew you, in all its energy, the
 “ sentiment with which all good people, all the friends of
 “ liberty are inspired, by the deplorable state into which
 “ the party, whose chief you appear to be, has reduced
 “ your unfortunate country.

“ I have not adopted the revolution which has already
 “ occasioned so many evils, because it was not necessary
 “ for rendering the people free and happy; or, if something
 “ was still wanting to this work, we had wiser and surer
 “ means of obtaining it, and on account of the fatal con-
 “ sequences which from that moment I foresaw of the
 “ overthrow of lawful authority. But, had I been at
 “ Geneva, I would have acted as the other citizens; I
 “ would have submitted to the new constitution; I would
 “ have supported the established authority in order to
 “ maintain it; and I would have awaited the result of
 “ time, experience, and union, for such changes as it
 “ might have been adviseable to make. This was the
 “ duty of every honest man, because it was the only
 “ means of restoring within our walls the mutual confi-
 “ dence of the Genevese, the esteem of our neighbours,
 “ arts, commerce, and all the sources of prosperity which
 “ vanished

“ vanished the moment we gave ourselves up to the chi-
 “ meras of a revolution which suited us so ill. But instead
 “ of following this track, what have you ventured to un-
 “ dertake? Why should the General Assembly have dis-
 “ appeared if your intention was to act in the name of the
 “ majority of the Nation? Where is the rallying point?
 “ How is the public good to be recognized where the na-
 “ tional will is trampled upon? What is this assembly of
 “ Revolutionists? Are they our conquerors, or our masters?
 “ Let them avow it, and every thing is explained; but af-
 “ ter a nocturnal invasion, who talks of *patriotism*, of
 “ *liberty*, and of *virtue*? I desire not to dispute the
 “ point of right with you, it would be an injury to your
 “ understanding. Have you done what you wished to
 “ do? This is the only question to ask you in the present
 “ state of things. All those who have lent a hand to
 “ these acts of violence appear indissolubly linked to you.
 “ The more you have to apprehend from a party which
 “ you have driven to despair, the more you will be
 “ united to hinder it from recovering its strength. This
 “ doubtless is what your policy has foreseen as an advan-
 “ tageous effect of this insurrection. But what is the con-
 “ sequence of it? You yourself, and all the chiefs, have
 “ placed yourselves in a dependence upon those who have
 “ been your agents; for they rightly perceive that they
 “ are more necessary to you, than you are to them, and
 “ that if they abandon you, you are undone. Thus there
 “ no longer exists authority over them. You appear the
 “ conductors, and you are the slaves. You preserve only
 “ an external authority at the price of the basest conces-
 “ sions. Should you regret the blood which they are de-
 “ sirous to spill, your influence ceases. Should you pos-
 “ sess no greater humanity than they, you will have more
 “ foresight, more policy, you will be desirous of prevent-
 “ ing the disorders which enter not into your views; but
 “ you will be obliged to authorise them, that you may not
 “ appear a *moderantiste*, an *endormeur*. The alternative of
 “ suffering one crime to be committed in order to hinder
 “ another, will be henceforth your pretext or your lot.
 “ Such is the flattering authority of those who have over-

" turned the laws; the impossibility of re establishing them
 " ought to make those tremble for themselves at least,
 " who meditate revolting against them. Tyrants one
 " day, they are tyrannized over the next; they are
 " dragged on for some time betwixt weakness and op-
 " probrium, until their rivals and their satellites be-
 " come equally sick of them. Suppose that your credit,
 " contrary to every example, should withstand these vi-
 " cissitudes, what scenes will Geneva present? What sort
 " of a country will you have made for yourselves? Re-
 " sentment, humiliation, grief in some; the distrust, me-
 " naces, arrogance, rankling in others; every heart ul-
 " cerated by hatred, and all the present generation rent
 " asunder by a rooted antipathy. Those who have suf-
 " fered will not be the most implacable; you are too
 " well acquainted with the human heart not to know
 " that the offended pardons, the offending never. Are
 " you to kill, banish, or plunder, all those who wear the
 " mourning of their country, and such as may be sus-
 " pected of disapproving these violences? What will you
 " render to your fellow-citizens that can indemnify them
 " for the losses they have sustained? What will you
 " render to them in lieu of that confidence and that re-
 " spect which they have always testified for one another,
 " in the very midst of dissensions? What will you render
 " to them after having deprived them of their own esteem
 " and that of their neighbours? What will you answer to
 " those who should come and reproach you that your
 " pretended efforts for liberty have ruined more families,
 " spilt more blood, and poisoned more sources of happi-
 " ness in the space of a few weeks, than aristocracy in its
 " greatest excesses had done in the space of many ages?
 " And that aristocracy no longer existed amongst us. . . .

" Do you regard this insurrection as a pecuniary re-
 " source? I will not now recount all the horrid effects
 " of these confiscations, which, admitting the crime of
 " the fathers, inflicts the punishment upon their innocent
 " children. Yet, even in Geneva itself, who is it that
 " believes them guilty of these pretended crimes? Where-
 " are their plots? What attempts have they made against
 " the

“ the laws ? Who has committed violence ? I will simply
 “ ask you if you think these iniquitous confiscations very
 “ profitable ? Whether the sums acquired by these means
 “ will not be exhausted by the payment of the revolu-
 “ tionists ? Whether you will not have the disgrace of
 “ having ruined the lawful possessors, without enriching
 “ the plunderers ? Whether you will not have destroyed
 “ the encouragement of industry and labour ? Whether
 “ you do not keep all those at a distance from Geneva
 “ who might be inclined to carry there the fruits of their
 “ economy in foreign countries ? Whether you do not
 “ condemn your country beyond redemption, never to
 “ rise again from her ruins ? You could not deceive your-
 “ self in these points, you have acted precisely like the
 “ savage spoken of by Montesquieu, which cut down the
 “ tree by the roots in order to gather the fruit.

“ I am far from imputing to your particular wish all
 “ the horrors which have been committed ; but when
 “ you destroy the empire of the law, when you excite the
 “ fury of a certain class of people, by those dark and
 “ vague surmises of conspiracy which are the eternal re-
 “ source of Tyranny ; when you put in motion men who
 “ have nothing to lose, either in fortune or reputation,
 “ but who are of consequence only in the day of terror and
 “ of crime, you are as much responsible for all which re-
 “ sults from it, as if you had done it with your own
 “ hand. That violation of asylum, the greatest possible
 “ infringement of liberty ; that night of consternation, in
 “ which citizens acted against their fellow-citizens like
 “ barbarians in a town taken by assault ; that distraction
 “ of the interior of every family, the sick, the old insulted
 “ and dragged to prison amidst the outrages of a mob,
 “ which completed its turpitude by insulting misfortune ;
 “ those unfortunate creatures abandoned to anguish and
 “ to hunger : all these previous violences were only steps
 “ to that revolutionary tribunal, which saves the inquisi-
 “ tion from being the most infernal of human inventions ;
 “ which would cause even a villain condemned in this
 “ manner to be pitied, but which is erected against those
 “ men only in whom it is not possible to find a crime.

“ And it is you—who are at the head of this revolution ! it is you who have spread destruction in a country all the individuals of which are your relations, your friends, or your acquaintance ! You, whom I have known burning with indignation against an act of cowardice or injustice ! You, who would have exposed your life to save even that of your enemy ! My God, how rapidly have you changed ! But the time will come when you will envy the lot of those victims which your revolution has made. I do not tell you that political crimes have always prepared the grave of those who commit them, that a popularity disgusting in its object is as inconstant as it is contemptible ; I do not tell you that a thousand events may change the order of things which uphold you, and that then you will no longer find an asylum, not a corner of the earth to shelter you from the terrible reproaches of your countrymen ; I do not remind you of the tragical end of him to whom Geneva owes her last misfortunes. Your natural intrepidity may perhaps make you feel a sort of pride in braving all these dangers ; but I can never believe that in certain moments your sensibility does not remove the veil of illusion with which you are fascinated ; the cry of humanity which resounds about you must secretly thrill your heart ; the evil which is past is irreparable, but you can do much to prevent its continuation. I conjure you, by yourself, by what you was before this epoch of madness and fanaticism, save your afflicted country and your fellow-citizens from despair.”

Can other examples be wanting to convince a nation so prosperous as yours, that it has every thing to lose, and nothing to gain by a revolution ? That when the people usurp the authority, they become immediately blind and irresistible instruments of oppression, a torrent which breaks through the strongest dikes ; whereas the necessary principles of a stable and legitimate government are to preserve, and increase the public prosperity ? That, whatever the constitution be, there is always a responsibility attached to those who hold the reins of government, which it is their interest to respect, and which so often does not exist

exist at all with popular parties? May you preserve the honourable reputation of a wise and peaceable people, attached to its ancient customs. Above all, may you never suffer yourselves to be dazzled by the deceitful lure which has consigned the French and the Genevese to such calamities. With this wish I conclude my letter.

I am, Sir, &c.


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
P. S. I have this moment received the *Account of the late revolution in Geneva, and of the conduct of France towards that Republic*, which I send you. You will easily recognise in it the pen of a true friend to liberty, who defends it so much the more ably as he expresses himself with force against its excesses. Although doubtless you are already acquainted with the events which it contains, it will not be less interesting for you to see them here collected. This tissue of crimes and misfortunes which has been the poisoned fruit of revolutionary fanaticism in my country, will speak more forcibly than any reasoning can do to those who are still disposed to launch into it.

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
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